

311 INSTITUTE · INTELLIGENCE UNIT



THE GLOBAL AI POWER INDEX

2026 — Who Can Build, Fund and
Defend Frontier AI

REPORT

Special Intelligence Report

BY

Matthew Griffin · London

DATE

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ABOUT THE 311 INSTITUTE

The 311 Institute, a London-based global leader in Futures, Deep Futures and Dynastic Futures advisory, exists to serve and help leaders anticipate, explore and shape every future.

History has repeatedly shown that organisations are made or broken by disruption — made by the shifts they saw and acted on in time, and broken by those they missed, misunderstood or met too late.

The VUCA-MAX world runs on accelerating, complex change — hard to anticipate, harder to answer. Almost half the world's CEOs believe their companies will not be economically viable within a decade without reinvention. That widening gap — seeing the future, understanding it, acting in time — is the one we exist to close.

With a track record of trust and excellence built advising the world's largest organisations, we close that gap in a way no one else can. Where others offer opinion we offer a record, where others see slices of the future we see the whole horizon, and where others offer partial solutions we offer everything.

Used by the world's most consequential organisations — among them Walmart, the world's largest employer, alongside ABB, Accenture, Adidas, Allianz, AON, ARM, AT&T, Auchan, BCG, BlackRock, Citigroup, Coca-Cola, DP World, Emirates Airlines, EY, the FAA, Google, HP, Huawei, KPMG, LGT, Nokia, Novartis, PepsiCo, PwC, Roche, RWE, Samsung, Siemens AG, Standard Chartered, T-Mobile, UBS, Visa, Workday, Worldpay and the United Nations, together with royal households and G7, G20 and G77 leaders. We advise boards, governments and investors across every industry and at every scale, helping countries grow and enterprises become Centennial companies built to endure beyond a hundred years.

In a world that punishes the unprepared, the gap between seeing the future and shaping it is all too often the one that determines who thrives and survives, and who doesn't. We close that gap.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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Matthew Griffin is a multi-award-winning futurist and expert in disruption and innovation, geopolitics, leadership and technology, described as a "walking encyclopaedia of the future" and a "futurist polymath." A 15-time best-selling author of the "Codex of the Future" series, he is the Founder and Futurist in Chief of the 311 Institute — a global Futures and Deep Futures advisory firm working with royal households, world leaders, G7, G20 and G77 governments, NGOs and multinational mid- and mega-cap firms to help them explore, shape and lead the next 50 years of business and society.

An award-winning YouTube creator with over a million followers and unrivalled global reach, Matthew is a highly sought-after international keynote speaker, lecturer and mentor. He collaborates with global leaders through the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to shape initiatives such as the UN's AI for Humanity programme, the UN Conference of the Parties (COP) and the World Economic Forum in Davos.

As the former Global Head of Cloud, National Security and Enterprise Sales for companies including Atos, Dell-EMC and IBM, Matthew has a proven track record of building multi-billion-dollar business units and turning failing divisions into market leaders. His ability to identify, analyse and communicate the implications of hundreds of emerging technologies and trends is unparalleled, and his insights are trusted by many of the world's most respected organisations.

Regularly featured in the global media — including the AP, BBC, Bloomberg, CNBC, Discovery, Forbes, Khaleej Times, the Telegraph, TIME, ViacomCBS, WIRED and the WSJ — Matthew's mission is to help organisations create a fair and sustainable future whose benefits are shared by everyone, irrespective of ability, background or circumstance.

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THE 311 INSTITUTE READ

IN BRIEF

A benchmark of national AI power — who can build, fund and defend frontier AI — on current, sourced or transparently constructed data, with a forward call for every pillar.

THE OBVIOUS READ

Most indices rank who has AI today, from data you cannot check. This one starts from the facts you can check, scores eight pillars on top of them, shows its working line by line, and asks which nations are on the right trajectory.

THE FULLER PICTURE


Eight pillars sit on a handful of facts so hard they barely need weighting. Five of the pillars are scored from a current national index. Security is built from the cyber-power literature and the network of national safety institutes. Deployment comes from a matrix of twelve industry sectors, and Trajectory from open data on compute and capital. Every figure is either current and cited, or a 311 estimate with its method shown on the page. Where no source exists, the cell is left blank rather than filled with a guess.


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The world has two full-stack AI powers — the United States and China — and a field of specialists behind them. On the 2025 evidence the United States owns the capital and the compute at a scale no one can match: \$285.9 billion of private AI investment against China's \$12.4 billion, and 5,427 AI data centres, more than ten times any other country. Yet on the one metric that may matter most, frontier model capability, China has closed the gap to under three percent — while spending twenty-three times less.





That contrast is the report's spine. A near-parity model can now be reached at a fraction of the leader's spend, so the decisive questions have moved to who can defend the stack, who can deploy it and who is improving fastest. This index scores all three. It starts from the facts that need almost no weighting, scores eight pillars on top, tracks diffusion across twelve verticals, and runs a live watch on the moves that could redraw the board inside a year — China's token-settlement economy and the single-foundry supply chain behind every leading model.

The 311 AI Power Index, mapped



Lower score  Higher  not ranked 

THE LEADING TEN

1	United States		100
2	China		73
3	Singapore		42
4	United Kingdom		35
5	South Korea		35
6	France		33
7	Israel		32
8	Canada		30
9	UAE		28
10	Germany		28

EVERY ECONOMY SHADED BY ITS OVERALL AI SCORE — DARKER IS STRONGER. TWO DARK POLES, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, STAND OUT ON A PALE FIELD. SIX RANKED ECONOMIES ARE NOT SHADED ON THIS SIMPLIFIED MAP — MOSTLY SMALL OR CITY-STATES (SINGAPORE 3RD, LUXEMBOURG, BAHRAIN, MALTA, MAURITIUS), PLUS CZECHIA — BUT ALL APPEAR IN THE FULL RANKING.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Two countries lead the world in AI — by a lot

This report scores 93 countries on eight kinds of AI strength — building the technology, funding it, and defending it. The United States comes first and China second. Everyone else is well behind, and bunched closely together.

UNITED STATES Ranked 1st		CHINA Ranked 2nd
100	Overall AI score out of 100	73
\$700 _{bn}	Money spent on AI US 2026 · China 2025	\$125 _{bn}
59%	Elite AI researchers held US: share of the world · China: share of its own	11%
\$50	Cost to run its best model output price, per million tokens	\$0.87
1×	GenAI patents filed China files about 6× the US — but trails on citation quality	6×
100	Compute-power score chips + electricity to run AI	91

2.7%

On the models themselves the gap is tiny — the best US model is just 2.7% ahead of the best Chinese one, and the two have swapped the lead since early 2025. The big score gap above is about the whole national picture, not the models.

WHAT THIS MEANS

- Two countries are far ahead of everyone else.** Below them, the countries ranked 3rd to 10th are close together, so their exact order shifts with small changes in method.
- China gets close for far less money.** Its best model costs a fraction to run and it reaches near-parity on a small share of the spending — so the contest is who turns money into capability, not who spends most.
- America wins on talent by attracting, not training.** Most leading AI researchers work in the US, but many were educated elsewhere — including in China, which trains many and keeps few.

01

CHAPTER ONE

THE 311 RANKING

The full league, and the aggregated findings.

THE VERDICT, IN FULL

The finding comes first — the full 311 ranking of all 93 economies, then the four results that define it.

311 INSTITUTE AI POWER LEAGUE • RANK 1-25

RANK	COUNTRY	311 SCORE	TIER
1	United States	94.7	FULL-STACK
2	China	69.4	FULL-STACK
3	Singapore	40.2	SPECIALIST
4	UK	33.0	LEADING
5	South Korea	33.0	LEADING
6	France	31.1	LEADING
7	Israel	30.5	LEADING
8	Canada	28.7	LEADING
9	UAE	26.8	LEADING
10	Germany	26.4	LEADING
11	Japan	25.9	LEADING
12	Switzerland	25.4	LEADING
13	Netherlands	24.6	CAPABLE
14	Saudi Arabia	23.0	CAPABLE
15	Taiwan	23.0	CAPABLE
16	India	22.5	CAPABLE
17	Finland	21.8	CAPABLE
18	Norway	20.8	CAPABLE
19	Sweden	20.1	CAPABLE
20	Denmark	19.9	CAPABLE
21	Australia	19.1	CAPABLE
22	Spain	19.0	CAPABLE
23	Ireland	18.9	CAPABLE
24	Malaysia	18.3	CAPABLE
25	Brazil	17.8	EMERGING

311 AI POWER COMPOSITE (0-100), ALL 93 ECONOMIES. RANKS 1-25. SOURCE: THE OBSERVER'S GLOBAL AI INDEX 2025 (6TH ED.), RE-WEIGHTED TO 311 PILLARS.

311 INSTITUTE AI POWER LEAGUE • RANK 26-50

RANK	COUNTRY	311 SCORE	TIER
26	Iceland	17.6	EMERGING
27	Luxembourg	17.4	EMERGING
28	Estonia	17.1	EMERGING
29	Russia	16.6	EMERGING
30	Italy	16.5	EMERGING
31	Austria	16.4	EMERGING
32	Greece	16.1	EMERGING
33	Qatar	16.0	EMERGING
34	Belgium	15.9	EMERGING
35	New Zealand	15.6	EMERGING
36	Hungary	15.5	EMERGING
37	Poland	15.4	EMERGING
38	Vietnam	15.2	EMERGING
39	Lithuania	14.9	EMERGING
40	Slovenia	14.8	EMERGING
41	Thailand	14.6	EMERGING
42	Portugal	14.5	EMERGING
43	Bahrain	14.4	EMERGING
44	Czech Rep.	14.0	EMERGING
45	Chile	13.9	EMERGING
46	Indonesia	13.2	EMERGING
47	Romania	12.8	EMERGING
48	Philippines	12.7	EMERGING
49	Egypt	12.5	EMERGING
50	Turkey	12.3	EMERGING

311 AI POWER COMPOSITE (0-100), ALL 93 ECONOMIES. RANKS 26-50. SOURCE: THE OBSERVER'S GLOBAL AI INDEX 2025 (6TH ED.), RE-WEIGHTED TO 311 PILLARS.

311 INSTITUTE AI POWER LEAGUE • RANK 51-75

RANK	COUNTRY	311 SCORE	TIER
51	Jordan	12.0	EMERGING
52	Colombia	11.9	NASCENT
53	Oman	11.8	NASCENT
54	Kuwait	11.8	NASCENT
55	South Africa	11.7	NASCENT
56	Uzbekistan	11.7	NASCENT
57	Serbia	11.6	NASCENT
58	Bulgaria	11.6	NASCENT
59	Peru	11.2	NASCENT
60	Latvia	11.0	NASCENT
61	Slovakia	10.9	NASCENT
62	Malta	10.8	NASCENT
63	Uruguay	10.6	NASCENT
64	Ukraine	10.5	NASCENT
65	Ghana	10.4	NASCENT
66	Costa Rica	10.3	NASCENT
67	Algeria	10.2	NASCENT
68	Morocco	10.1	NASCENT
69	Armenia	10.0	NASCENT
70	Mauritius	9.7	NASCENT
71	Mexico	9.7	NASCENT
72	Argentina	9.5	NASCENT
73	Croatia	9.2	NASCENT
74	Nigeria	9.1	NASCENT
75	Tajikistan	9.1	NASCENT

311 AI POWER COMPOSITE (0-100), ALL 93 ECONOMIES. RANKS 51-75. SOURCE: THE OBSERVER'S GLOBAL AI INDEX 2025 (6TH ED.), RE-WEIGHTED TO 311 PILLARS.

311 INSTITUTE AI POWER LEAGUE • RANK 76-93

RANK	COUNTRY	311 SCORE	TIER
76	Azerbaijan	9.1	NASCENT
77	Pakistan	8.9	NASCENT
78	Iran	8.9	NASCENT
79	Senegal	8.6	NASCENT
80	Kenya	8.5	NASCENT
81	Sri Lanka	8.5	NASCENT
82	Dominican Rep.	8.0	NASCENT
83	Nepal	7.7	NASCENT
84	Cote d'Ivoire	7.5	NASCENT
85	Tunisia	7.3	NASCENT
86	Bangladesh	7.2	NASCENT
87	Rwanda	6.9	NASCENT
88	Iraq	6.9	NASCENT
89	Zambia	6.7	NASCENT
90	Benin	6.6	NASCENT
91	Cambodia	6.3	NASCENT
92	Ethiopia	5.8	NASCENT
93	Sierra Leone	4.6	NASCENT

311 AI POWER COMPOSITE (0-100), ALL 93 ECONOMIES. RANKS 76-93. SOURCE: THE OBSERVER'S GLOBAL AI INDEX 2025 (6TH ED.), RE-WEIGHTED TO 311 PILLARS.

Four findings define the field. Two countries hold the frontier: the United States (94.7) and China (69.4) score across every capability pillar, and the gap from second to third is larger than the spread across the entire rest of the top ten. Everything else in the report explains how those two got there — and who, if anyone, can join them.

One specialist breaks the pattern: Singapore (40.2), which turned governance and adoption, not scale, into a top-three position. Behind it, the next seven are packed tight — the United Kingdom and South Korea tie at 33.0, then France, Israel, Canada, the UAE and Germany, separated by low single digits, each leading on a different pillar — Israel on venture intensity per head, the UAE on sovereign capital and top-ranked governance, the UK and France on research and safety institutions — and, as the sensitivity test confirms, reordering under small changes in weighting.

The report's throughline runs the whole way down the table: national totals no longer map onto frontier leadership. The United States spends 23 times China's private capital for a 2.7% lead on the frontier benchmark. China trains the researchers the United States employs. China files 6 times the patents but trails on citation quality. The money, the talent and the patents each sit in a different place from the lead itself.

Two moves sit outside the ranking but could redraw it within a year, and the report tracks both: China's standardisation of the AI token — 'ciyuan' — as a priceable, tradable settlement unit, and the single-foundry dependency on TSMC that no amount of capital can quickly route around. Neither would move a country by a single place. Each would move an entire pillar.

Every number above is a labelled 311 construct — transformed from a licensed third-party index set and re-weighted to 311's pillars, each figure carrying its source, the whole composite cross-validated against Stanford's open Vibrancy index in Part Thirteen. The pages that follow build it up from those facts, pillar by pillar.

Two powers, a specialist, and a long tail of 93.

The top three are settled. Everything below them still moves.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

- 1 Where does your nation rank?
- 2 Is your gap to the leader closing?
- 3 Which pillar would move your rank most?

02

CHAPTER TWO


THE HARD FACTS

The six that decide the race.

THE FACTS THAT BARELY MOVE

A competitiveness index is only its numbers. Above the eight pillars sit six facts so hard they need almost no weighting — counts, shares and binaries that settle who is winning before any weight is applied.

Who builds the frontier — notable AI models, 2025



NOTABLE AI MODELS PRODUCED, 2025. SOURCE: STANFORD HAI, 2026 AI INDEX (RESOLVES THE 50/30-VS-59/35 DISCREPANCY TO 50/30). A LONG SINGLE-DIGIT TAIL — THE UK, SOUTH KOREA, CANADA, FRANCE — FOLLOWS THE TWO LEADERS.

It reads on six facts: frontier models produced, installed frontier compute, control of the compute supply chain, the AI power delivered to that compute, realised AI economic output, and sovereignty — the ability to run the full stack without another state's permission. On the first, two countries ship and everyone else buys: the United States produced roughly 50 notable models in 2025 to China's 30, with a long single-digit tail behind.

Compute concentrates the same way, and it is scaling violently — the global stock of AI computing power is growing about 3.4 times a year. The United States hosts 5,427 AI data centres, more than

ten times any other country. But the chokepoint sits elsewhere: a single foundry, TSMC in Taiwan, fabricates almost every leading AI chip, so the entire supply chain has one physical point of failure that no amount of capital can quickly route around.



That is the verdict in one line: a two-nation frontier, and a long queue to join it. Everything the pillars add is explanation of how the two got there and where the queue might break. The picture itself rarely moves, which is why the index leads with these facts rather than burying them in a weighted average.

Realised output — what all the spending produced — is the fact everyone dodges because it is hardest to measure. This index constructs it rather than omitting it, and treats it as the test the pillars build toward: capability that cannot be converted to output is a cost, not power. Two clarifications guard these facts. They are descriptive, not normative — leading is not leading well, and a state can top them while trailing on the governance and security that make a lead durable. And they are not the composite: they are what the composite must never contradict. Where a pillar score and one of these facts disagree, the fact wins and the weighting is re-examined.

Two countries produce the frontier. Everyone else consumes it.

The facts are the verdict. The pillars explain them.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

- 1 Which of these facts is your real constraint?
- 2 Do you produce the frontier or consume it?
- 3 Where does sovereignty bind?

03

CHAPTER THREE

COMPUTE & INFRASTRUCTURE

The physical base — and the build-out that gates it.

COMPUTE IS DESTINY

Every model rests on accelerators, the power to run them, and the physical build-out to house them. This is the pillar most indices omit — and where 2026's real bottleneck lives: not chips, but gigawatts.

AI data centres, by country (2025)



AI DATA-CENTRE COUNT. SOURCE: STANFORD HAI, 2026 AI INDEX. THE US HOSTS >10X ANY OTHER NATION. THE SECOND BAR IS THAT CEILING.

The United States' compute lead is physical and hard to contest quickly: 5,427 AI data centres, the Stargate build committing \$100-500 billion by 2029, and the largest single facility already near 1.1 million H100-equivalents. The economics are brutal — a one-gigawatt AI data centre runs about \$38 billion in up-front capital, and can be built in roughly two years, which means the true constraint is no longer the order book for chips but the interconnection queue for power.

China answers with the world's largest installed robot and industrial base and a state push on domestic fabrication, but it builds under an export-control regime that throttles its access to leading-edge accelerators. The rest of the field divides into the power-rich (the Gulf, the Nordics, Iceland) courting compute with cheap energy, and the power-constrained, whose grids cannot yet feed the data centres their strategies assume.

PREDICTION

▶ SHIFT

70% estimate · 2027

Grid interconnection, not chip supply, is the binding constraint on Western frontier compute through 2027.

BASIS

1GW is about \$38bn capex buildable in ~2yr vs multi-year grid/interconnection lead times. Frontier training power rising ~2.2x/yr

TRIPWIRE


A major frontier build slips primarily on chip allocation rather than power/permitting

Read that way, the pillar is really a power-and-permitting race wearing a silicon mask. The country that wins it will be the one that can turn megawatts into training runs fastest, and on current evidence that is a contest of grid planning and permitting throughput as much as of chip allocation.

For the field behind the two leaders, that reframing is an opening: a mid-sized economy with abundant clean power and a fast permitting regime can host frontier-scale compute it could never have designed or fabricated itself. Iceland, the Nordics and the Gulf are already competing on exactly this basis — renting relevance in the compute era by supplying the one input that cannot be shipped in a container.

So the 311 read scores compute on three things at once — installed accelerators, the power to run them, and the build-out capacity to house both — rather than chip counts alone. It is the pillar most likely to reorder the field this decade, because the binding constraint is now the one input that money moves slowest: dispatchable electricity at the right place and time.

Below the two leaders, two different routes explain who punches above their size, and the pillar rewards both. The power-rich host frontier compute on cheap or green electricity: Iceland, Norway and the Gulf turn abundant energy and fibre into data-centre capacity they could never fabricate themselves. The connectivity-and-governance hubs earn their place another way. Singapore ranks third not on cheap power, which it lacks, but on installed density (over 70 data centres, about 1.4 gigawatts), its role as South-East Asia's subsea-cable and cloud nexus, and an operating environment that de-risks every megawatt it does build, even under the strictest sustainability caps in Asia. The Netherlands sits on the same logic. The compute map therefore tracks two things at once, the energy map for the hosts and the connectivity-and-trust map for the hubs, rather than wealth alone.

Compute capability — top 12 (0-100)

COMPUTE SUB-PILLAR SCORE, TOP 12 OF 93 (0-100). SOURCE: 311 COMPOSITE (COMPUTE INPUTS: ACCELERATORS, DATA-CENTRE CAPACITY, CLOUD, POWER). NOTE THE SMALL, ENERGY-RICH STATES ABOVE THE MID-TABLE.

Compute is destiny, and the grid is the new bottleneck.

Models are limited by metal, power and the people who build both.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

- 1 Is compute, power or permitting your binding constraint?
- 2 Who controls your chips?
- 3 Can the grid feed the data centres you plan?

04


CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH & INNOVATION

Where the frontier is made.

THE CONVERGING FRONTIER

Research is where raw compute becomes capability. In 2025 it delivered the report's most destabilising finding: the capability gap between the two leaders has all but closed.




As of March 2026 the leading US model sat about 2.7% ahead of the leading Chinese model, and the two have traded the top spot repeatedly since DeepSeek-R1 matched the frontier in February 2025. Capability itself is moving fast in absolute terms — the composite capability frontier has advanced roughly 14 points a year since reasoning models arrived — but it is moving for both powers at once.

The strategic reading is not that China has 'won' research. It is that a near-parity model can now be reached at a fraction of the leader's spend. That shifts the contest away from who has the best

model this quarter and toward who can defend, deploy and sustain a lead — the pillars that follow.

GenAI patent families, 2014-2023




GENERATIVE-AI PATENT FAMILIES BY INVENTOR COUNTRY, 2014-2023. SOURCE: WIPO PATENT LANDSCAPE REPORT ON GENAI (2024) + 2026 SPARK UPDATE.

Volume, though, is a different axis from capability — and on volume China is not closing a gap, it is the runaway leader. WIPO counts roughly 38,000 Chinese generative-AI patent families over 2014-2023 to America's 6,300, a six-to-one lead and more than the next four countries combined. Since 2017 China has out-published the rest of the world put together, and it added another 43,000 families in 2024-25 alone. The United States is accelerating from behind (a 92% recent growth rate, the fastest of any major), but from far back.

The catch is that China's patent lead does not convert one-for-one into frontier capability — its filings lead the world in count but lag in citations, the crude proxy for quality. That gap between quantity and quality is the third inversion in this report, after capital-without-capability and talent-produced-elsewhere — three different measures all saying the same thing, that raw national totals no longer map cleanly onto who leads at the frontier.

Below the frontier pair, research capability is broader but shallower. The United Kingdom, South Korea, France and Israel hold real strength, and a cluster of small, research-dense economies — Switzerland, Finland, Singapore — rank far above their size per head, even as their absolute output trails the two leaders by an order of magnitude.

Research capability — top 12 (0-100)

RESEARCH SUB-PILLAR SCORE, TOP 12 OF 93 (0-100). SOURCE: 311 COMPOSITE (RESEARCH INPUTS: PUBLICATIONS, PATENTS, TOP-LAB PRESENCE, BENCHMARK SHARE).

Two nations trade the frontier lead. The field publishes behind them.

Capability is converging even as capital diverges.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

- 1 Do you produce frontier models or adapt them?
- 2 Is your research converting to deployed capability?
- 3 Where is your citation base going?

05

CHAPTER FIVE

TALENT & HUMAN CAPITAL

The scarce input capital cannot instantly buy.

THE SCARCE INPUT

Compute and capital can be bought in a year. A research base cannot. Talent is the pillar with the longest lead time and the strongest incumbency advantage.

TALENT — PRODUCED VS EMPLOYED (ELITE AI RESEARCHERS)

COUNTRY	ROLE	PRODUCES	EMPLOYS / RETAINS
China	FACTORY	38% of the elite — the #1 source	Keeps 11%, 72% go to the US
United States	MAGNET	Modest home-grown share	Employs 59% of the world elite
India	FACTORY	Deep, fast-growing pipeline	A net talent exporter

WHERE ELITE AI RESEARCHERS ARE TRAINED VS WHERE THEY WORK. SOURCE: MACROPOLLO GLOBAL AI TALENT TRACKER 3.0 (2025).

The talent pillar is the clearest case of the report's recurring inversion: China produces the researchers and the United States employs them. US institutions house 59% of the world's elite AI researchers, measured by top-tier publications — but that lead is imported, not home-grown. China is the single largest source (38% of NeurIPS-2024 researchers did their undergraduate there), yet only 11% of its top talent stays. 72% end up in the United States.

This is the pillar with the longest lead time and the strongest incumbency, because talent clusters where the compute and capital already sit. It is also the most policy-exposed: the US lead rests on remaining open to foreign researchers, and the flow is already slowing as more talent stays home. India — a deep pipeline now retaining more of its own — is the country most able to change the picture this decade.

PREDICTION

▶ HOLD

65% estimate · 2028

Talent inflows, not domestic training, remain the top-two powers' decisive edge through 2028.

BASIS

Clustering of elite researchers with compute+capital. Multi-year lead time on home-grown research bases

TRIPWIRE

A challenger state builds a top-quartile research base without net talent inflow

The lever, then, is not producing researchers but keeping the ones a country attracts — and, for the exporters, converting a pipeline into retained capability. It is the slowest pillar to move and the one where an open-door policy, not a budget line, is the decisive variable.

It is also the pillar most exposed to politics. A single shift in visa or immigration policy can redirect a decade of accumulated advantage, because the asset walks home each night and can choose to stay there. The countries that treat researchers as infrastructure rather than headcount are the ones whose lead here will prove durable.

Where China's elite AI researchers go




DESTINATION OF CHINA'S ELITE AI RESEARCHERS (SHARE OF THE CHINA-TRAINED COHORT).
SOURCE: MACROPOLO GLOBAL AI TALENT TRACKER 3.0. CHINA IS THE SINGLE LARGEST
SOURCE OF TOP RESEARCHERS. THE UNITED STATES IS WHERE MOST END UP.

For challengers the same fact is the opening: talent is the one frontier input that can be attracted rather than built, and a decisive shift in openness can move a nation up this pillar faster than any amount of domestic training. It is the slowest advantage to accumulate and, for exactly that reason, the most valuable to hold.

Below the United States the talent pillar rewards both scale and concentration. China holds half the US score. Behind it, a cluster of research-dense small economies, Singapore, Switzerland and Israel, and India's deep pipeline, rank well above their population weight, even as most of the elite they train leaves for the American labs.

Talent capability — top 12 (0-100)



TALENT SUB-PILLAR SCORE, TOP 12 OF 93 (0-100). SOURCE: 311 COMPOSITE (TALENT INPUTS: ELITE-RESEARCHER STOCK, PRODUCTION AND RETENTION, UNIVERSITY PIPELINE).

Talent still concentrates in the US, but the pipeline is global.

Elite researchers cluster where the compute and capital already are.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

- 1 Are you growing talent or renting it?
- 2 Can you retain the researchers you train?
- 3 Where does your pipeline originate?

06

CHAPTER SIX

CAPITAL & COMMERCIALISATION

Who funds AI, and who actually earns from it.

MONEY IN, MONEY OUT

Two questions sit in one pillar. Who can fund AI at frontier scale, and who actually earns from it once it is built. On the first the United States is untouchable. On the second the picture is unresolved for everyone.

Private AI investment, 2025




PRIVATE AI INVESTMENT, 2025 (USD BN). SOURCE: STANFORD HAI, 2026 AI INDEX (QUID). US:CHINA RATIO 23.1X. EXCLUDES CHINA'S STATE GUIDANCE FUNDS.

The United States drew \$285.9 billion of private AI investment in 2025 — 23 times China's \$12.4 billion and 48 times the UK's \$5.9 billion — and funded 1,953 new AI companies to China's 161. On raw capital there is one power and a long way down.

The figure that should trouble a US strategist is the ratio, not the total. China reached a sub-three-percent capability gap on roughly one twenty-third of the private capital. Past some threshold, money buys scale and the room to absorb a failed bet rather than a widening frontier — which is how a challenger stays close on a fraction of the spend, and why Trajectory (Part Ten) treats conversion, not spend, as the signal that matters.

Capital is only half the pillar. The other half is commercialisation — turning all that money and capability into revenue — and it is where the boom looks least like a victory.

AI money in versus money out, 2026



2026, USD BN. HYPERSCALER CAPEX: FIVE-FIRM COMBINED GUIDE (FUTURUM). NVIDIA DATA-CENTRE REVENUE ANNUALISED FROM Q2 FY27 (\$89BN X4 — A 311 CONSTRUCT, SEC). LAB REVENUE: COMBINED ANNUALISED, AUG 2026 (GOLDMAN SACHS).

Set the money going in against the money coming out. The five largest US cloud builders guide to about \$700 billion of AI capital spending in 2026, close to double 2025's \$410 billion, and Goldman Sachs puts the cumulative bill at roughly \$7.6 trillion through 2031. Against that, the two leading model labs, OpenAI and Anthropic, reached a combined annualised revenue of about \$105 billion by August 2026. One year of building is running at close to seven times the revenue of the two flagship labs put together.

The profit that does exist is being captured a layer below the AI. Nvidia booked \$89 billion of data-centre revenue in the single quarter to July 2026, at a 75% gross margin — more in three months than the two leading labs earn in a year combined. So far the dependable earnings sit with the company selling the hardware, not with the labs building on it.

For the companies buying AI rather than building it, the return is mostly missing. MIT's 2025 study of enterprise adoption found that of \$30-40 billion spent on generative-AI pilots, 95% showed no measurable impact on profit and loss. The 5% that did almost always bought from an outside vendor rather than building in-house.

Where commercialisation is working, distribution carries it, not model quality. Microsoft's AI business passed a \$37 billion annual run-rate with 30 million paid Copilot seats — not because it holds the best model, but because it sells AI inside the software companies already run: Office, Azure and GitHub. Its advantage is where the AI sits, not how good it is.


The independent path is narrowing. Cerebras withdrew its stock-market listing in late 2025. Nvidia licensed the chip design of its rival Groq for about \$20 billion and took its founder. Meta bought

the agent startup Manus for roughly \$2 billion. For a challenger, the clearest outcome so far has been absorption by an incumbent, not a business of its own.

China commercialises from the opposite end. Its total AI investment, about \$125 billion in 2025, trails the United States — but a domestic price war has driven the cost of using a model toward zero. DeepSeek's V4-Pro sells output at about \$0.87 per million tokens against roughly \$50 for a leading US model, and RAND put Chinese models at a sixth to a quarter of US running costs in early 2026. Six of the ten most-used models on the developer marketplace OpenRouter are now Chinese. Beijing has begun warning its own firms against 'involution' — its word for a race to the bottom on price.

The startup layer tells the same story in the primary market. AI companies raised roughly \$200-226 billion of venture capital in 2025 (about half of all venture funding on earth, up 75% in a year), and the money is as concentrated as the returns. US startups took about \$159 billion of it, close to four-fifths of the global total, with the San Francisco Bay Area alone at \$122 billion. The United Kingdom (~\$17 billion), China (~\$14 billion), France (\$8.5 billion) and Germany (\$8.4 billion) are the next tier, and a long way back.

AI startup venture funding, 2025



AI STARTUP VC BY COUNTRY, 2025 (USD BN). SOURCE: CRUNCHBASE, CORROBORATED BY OECD.AI (PREQIN) AND CB INSIGHTS. US SHARE ~79%. FIGURES FOR UK/FR/DE ARE NATIONAL VENTURE TOTALS, AI-LED.

Two features make it more concentrated still. Foundation-model labs took roughly \$80-86 billion (about 40% of all AI funding), with OpenAI, Anthropic and xAI alone raising \$86.3 billion, and \$100-million-plus mega-rounds accounted for 79% of the year's total. The primary market is not funding a broad ecosystem so much as a handful of frontier labs and the infrastructure around

them. Into the first half of 2026 the pattern sharpened: OpenAI and Anthropic together raised about \$217 billion, roughly 43% of all startup funding, anywhere, in six months.

WHERE THE LABS ARE — AI VENTURE FUNDING, 2025

COUNTRY	AI VC	LEADING FOUNDATION-MODEL LABS
United States	\$159B	OpenAI, Anthropic, xAI, Meta, Google DeepMind
United Kingdom	\$17B	Google DeepMind (London), Isomorphic Labs
China	~\$14B	DeepSeek, Moonshot, Zhipu, Alibaba (Qwen)
France	\$8.5B	Mistral, Black Forest Labs
Germany	\$8.4B	Helsing, Aleph Alpha

LEADING FOUNDATION-MODEL LABS AND 2025 AI VENTURE FUNDING, BY COUNTRY. SOURCE: CRUNCHBASE, CB INSIGHTS, OECD.AI. NATIONAL VENTURE TOTALS FOR UK/FR/DE.

Read against the earlier chart, the ecosystem confirms the pillar's verdict. The money going into AI — capex and venture alike — is enormous, concentrated in the United States, and running well ahead of the revenue coming out. Europe funds a real but early-stage field (81% of its 2024 AI deals were seed or Series A). China's venture market has thinned under regulatory and export pressure even as its models lead on price, and the Gulf is buying in fast from a small base. One country owns the capital and the ecosystem. Whether that converts into durable commercial advantage is the open question Trajectory takes up.

PREDICTION

► SHIFT

55% estimate · 2027

The gap between AI capital spending and AI revenue narrows but does not close by 2027, and the first large write-downs of AI infrastructure appear.

BASIS

~\$700bn/yr hyperscaler capex against ~\$105bn combined lab revenue. 3-5yr hardware life, and about \$1tn ARR reportedly needed by 2030


TRIPWIRE

Combined leading-lab revenue passes \$300bn annualised during 2027

Read together, the two halves invert the headline. On capital the United States cannot lose. On commercialisation no one has yet won: the money going in dwarfs the money coming out, the returns that exist accrue to the hardware layer, and most buyers see nothing back yet. That is why the signal that matters sits in Trajectory — who turns spend into capability, and capability into revenue — not in the size of the cheque.

Capital is the most concentrated pillar in the index. The United States scores 100 and China 45. The rest of the field sits below a third, with Israel the standout on venture intensity per head and the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, buying onto the board with sovereign money rather than a domestic venture market.

Capital capability — top 12 (0-100)



CAPITAL SUB-PILLAR SCORE, TOP 12 OF 93 (0-100). SOURCE: 311 COMPOSITE (CAPITAL INPUTS: PRIVATE AI INVESTMENT, VENTURE FUNDING, SOVEREIGN COMMITMENTS).



One country owns the capital. No one has yet won the returns.

The money going in still dwarfs the money coming out.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

- 1 Is capital your constraint, or conversion?
- 2 Who captures the value your AI creates?
- 3 Can you commercialise without owning distribution?

07

CHAPTER SEVEN

GOVERNANCE & POLICY

Three models, one fragmenting world.

THREE MODELS DIVERGE

Three regulatory philosophies now compete for the world's default: the American market-led model, the European rights-led model, and the Chinese state-directed model. Alignment is becoming a geopolitical choice.

The United States leads on government AI readiness while regulating lightly. The EU AI Act entered full enforcement in January 2026, setting the global rights-and-risk template even as critics warn it taxes the capital it needs. China directs through the state, and is now standardising the very unit of the AI economy (see Part Twelve). Singapore shows the fourth path — small-state governance as a competitive weapon, turning trust and adoption into a magnet for compute and talent it cannot grow at scale.

PREDICTION
► SHIFT


70% estimate · 2027

At least three mutually incompatible AI-governance blocs are operating by end-2027, forcing third countries to pick a stack.

BASIS EU AI Act enforcement live. US market-led divergence. China's state-directed standard-setting	TRIPWIRE A binding cross-bloc interoperability agreement (EU-US-China) is signed
---	--

Choosing a stack is fast becoming a foreign-policy act, not an IT one. As the three models harden, third countries are being asked to align on standards, chips and cloud at once, and the governance pillar increasingly measures which bloc a nation is drifting toward rather than the elegance of its own rules.

Governance is the one pillar the United States does not lead. The strategy-led states top it, the UAE, Singapore and South Korea ahead of France, China and the UK, because the score rewards clear national direction and adoption-ready rules rather than raw capability. It is the pillar where a small, well-run state can out-rank a superpower, and the clearest opening for a nation that cannot win on compute or capital.

Governance capability — top 12 (0-100)

GOVERNANCE SUB-PILLAR SCORE, TOP 12 OF 93 (0-100). SOURCE: 311 COMPOSITE (GOVERNANCE INPUTS: NATIONAL STRATEGY, REGULATORY READINESS, PUBLIC-SECTOR ADOPTION). THE UNITED STATES RANKS EIGHTH.

The US builds, the EU regulates, China directs — and the world must choose a stack.

Governance is now a competitive weapon, not a brake.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

- 1 Whose regulatory model are you aligning to?
- 2 Does your governance attract or repel capital?
- 3 Can your state enforce what it writes?

08

CHAPTER EIGHT

SECURITY & RESILIENCE

Who can defend the AI they build?

ADVANTAGE YOU CAN DEFEND

The hard facts measure who can build AI. This pillar measures who can defend it. It is where the report's data problem is sharpest — the field's cyber-power rankings are frozen at 2021-2022 — and where, in a single year, the ground moved under everyone.

Start with what is known and what is not. Cyber commitment has saturated: the ITU's 2024 index puts 46 states in its top tier at a global average of 65.7, so institutional readiness no longer separates the leaders. Cyber power has not saturated, but the two authoritative capability assessments are old. Harvard's National Cyber Power Index still stands at its 2022 edition — the United States first, China second, Russia third, the UK fourth, Australia fifth — and the IISS tiers date to 2021. No current comprehensive public ranking exists, so the pillar is a labelled construct, not a borrowed number.

CYBER POWER — THE CONSTRUCT INPUTS

LAYER	READING	SOURCE
CAPABILITY TIER 1	United States, alone	IISS / Belfer 2022
CAPABILITY TIER 2	China, UK, France + 6	IISS / Belfer 2022
COMMITMENT 2024	46 states in the top tier	ITU GCI 2024
AGENTIC SIGNALS	First AI-run state attack, 2025	311 construct

P6 IS A LABELLED 311 CONSTRUCT: AGE-DISCOUNTED CAPABILITY BASELINE (IISS CYBER CAPABILITIES & NATIONAL POWER (2021/2023), HARVARD BELFER NCPI 2022) + CURRENT COMMITMENT (ITU GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY INDEX 2024) + 2025-26 AGENTIC-CYBER SIGNALS.

This report's own draft predicted that AI-enabled offensive cyber would become a named, attributed factor in a major incident before the end of 2027. It landed early. In September 2025 a Chinese state-sponsored group, designated GTG-1002, ran what Anthropic and multiple outlets describe as the first AI-orchestrated cyber-espionage campaign at scale. The attackers manipulated an agentic coding tool into executing an estimated 80 to 90 percent of the operation itself — reconnaissance,

exploitation, lateral movement, exfiltration — against roughly thirty technology, finance, chemical and government targets, with humans stepping in only at a few decision points.

THE AGENTIC-CYBER SHIFT, 2025-26

SIGNAL	WHAT HAPPENED	SOURCE
First AI-run attack	GTG-1002 (China state) executed 80-90% autonomously against ~30 targets	Anthropic, Nov 2025
Scale of misuse	832 malicious-use accounts mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework	Verizon 2026 DBIR
Cost of attack	Ransomware exfiltration up 92.7%. Identity attacks up 32% in H1	2025-26 threat reports
Defensive regime	Frontier-model access limited to a consortium: 9 firms, then NATO, ENISA, ~150 orgs	Carnegie, 2026

CURRENT AI-SPECIFIC SECURITY SIGNALS, 2025-26. SOURCES ON THE PAGE. FULL PROVENANCE IN THE DATA APPENDIX.

The significance is not one incident but a change in the cost of attack. AI now supplies instant expertise, so the old link between an attacker's sophistication and the complexity of what they can attempt has broken. Anthropic mapped 832 malicious-use accounts to the MITRE ATT&CK framework over the year to March 2026, work published in Verizon's 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report. North Korean operatives used the same tools to hold remote engineering jobs at US firms. Ransomware data-exfiltration rose 92.7 percent year on year. The tempo and reach of state and criminal operations are climbing because the labour is now machine labour.

Defence has produced a new axis of power that no index yet scores: privileged access to the most capable models. When a frontier model can find and exploit zero-day vulnerabilities on its own, who is allowed to hold it becomes a security question in itself. The clearest case is the access consortium formed around the most advanced models — critical-software firms including Amazon, Apple, Google, JPMorgan, Microsoft and Nvidia, joined by NATO and the EU's cybersecurity agency, and expanded by mid-2026 to roughly 150 organisations across fifteen countries. Membership, not geography, increasingly marks who sits inside the defensive perimeter.

PREDICTION

▶ SHIFT

65% estimate · 2027

Agentic offensive cyber diffuses to less-sophisticated actors within the year, shifting the advantage to attackers until autonomous defence is deployed at comparable scale.

BASIS

First state AI-orchestrated attack Sep-Nov 2025.
Frontier misuse rising (832 MITRE-mapped accounts). Comparable models expected widely held within 6-12 months

TRIPWIRE

A second state publicly attributes a major incident to an autonomous AI agent

Read across nations, the pillar now says three things. The United States still holds both stacks — the top capability score and the densest defensive network, including the frontier-access regime centred on its firms. China demonstrated the offensive side of the agentic shift first, at state scale. And a cluster of open economies — the UK, France, Israel, the Netherlands, Germany, with Canada and Australia — hold strong defensive institutions and the national AI safety and security institutes that are becoming the civilian layer of cyber-defence. The gap that matters is no longer commitment. It is who can defend a model that can now attack on its own.

The honest position is the one the construct states plainly: the capability rankings are frozen at 2022, the commitment layer has saturated, and the decisive edge — offensive and defensive — has moved to AI itself, faster than any public index has measured. The report builds that read from current, provenanced signals rather than borrowing a stale number, and flags every input as fact or construct.

The capability rankings are frozen at 2022. The threat went agentic in 2025.

The prediction this pillar made has already landed.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

- 1 Is your AI advantage matched by the security to defend it?
- 2 Who holds both stacks in your region?
- 3 Can you defend a model that can now attack on its own?

09

CHAPTER NINE


DEPLOYMENT & DIFFUSION

Capability is the stock. Deployment is the flow.

A DIFFERENT RACE

A model that goes unused is a cost. This pillar scores realised deployment across twelve verticals — and its headline is that the diffusion leaders are not the capability leaders.

Manufacturing robot density (per 10,000 employees, 2024)



ROBOT DENSITY, MANUFACTURING. SOURCE: IFR WORLD ROBOTICS 2025. CHINA'S DENSITY IS LOW BUT ITS ABSOLUTE STOCK (~2M UNITS) IS THE WORLD'S LARGEST — 54% OF 2024 INSTALLS.

Take the two most sourceable verticals. In manufacturing, South Korea (1,220 robots per 10,000 workers) and Singapore (818) lead the world, with Germany, Japan and the US behind. China's density is low because its workforce is vast, yet it holds the largest absolute robot stock on earth and took 54% of 2024's global installations. In finance — the second-fastest adopter after tech, where 54% of financial firms had deployed AI by early 2025, but the country leaders invert again: China's banks lead on generative-AI use (83%), ahead of the UK (75%) and a US led by its largest institutions.

PREDICTION

▶ HOLD

65% estimate · 2027

A capability leader (US or China) is out-diffused on realised enterprise adoption by a smaller state through 2027.

BASIS

Korea/Singapore robot-density lead. Singapore 61%/UAE 64% above-income adoption. US mid-table on diffusion

TRIPWIRE

The US or China tops both a capability pillar and the enterprise-diffusion cut simultaneously

The cross-vertical spine confirms the split. Seventy percent of organisations now use generative AI in at least one function. The standout adopters relative to their income are Singapore (61%) and the UAE (64%), while the United States — the capability leader — sits mid-table on the diffusion cut. Nine of the twelve verticals lack clean per-country data and are held void rather than guessed. The pattern is the point: building the frontier and diffusing it are different competencies, and small, governed states are winning the second race.

What a nation deploys, not what it builds, is the truer read on what AI is doing to it. A country can lead the frontier and still lag in diffusion, or trail on capability and out-deploy everyone in the verticals that reward focus — which is why deployment is scored separately rather than assumed from capability.

Read across the full matrix, the split sharpens into a rule. In the heavy verticals — defence, energy, transport, health — deployment tracks capability: the two powers lead because these need scale, capital and a frontier base. In the efficiency verticals — manufacturing, finance, public services — it inverts: Korea, Singapore and the UK out-deploy their capability rank because diffusion there rewards governance and focus, not size. A nation's deployment profile, in other words, tells you which kind of AI power it is.

The matrix also shows where the report declines to guess. Nine of the twelve verticals still lack clean per-country data in 2026, and those cells are held void rather than filled — so the grid below shades only what the sources support, darkest where realised adoption is deepest. Even on that partial read the shape is unmistakable: the heavy verticals cluster under the two powers, the efficiency verticals under the small, well-run states.

THE DEPLOYMENT MATRIX — ADOPTION INTENSITY

	US	CHINA	KOREA	UK	SINGAPORE	GERMANY
Manufacturing						
Finance						
Health						
Defence						
Energy / grid						
Transport / AVs						
Public sector						
Professional svc						

REALISED AI-ADOPTION INTENSITY BY VERTICAL AND COUNTRY — DARKER IS HIGHER. A LABELLED 311 CONSTRUCT GROUNDED IN THE SOURCED VERTICALS (IFR 2025, S&P/EY 2025, OECD 2026, SIPRI 2026, IEA 2025-26, OXFORD INSIGHTS 2025, HAI 2026). CELLS VOID WHERE NO SIGNAL. NOTE THE SPLIT: THE HEAVY VERTICALS (DEFENCE, ENERGY) DARKEN UNDER THE US AND CHINA. THE EFFICIENCY VERTICALS (MANUFACTURING, PUBLIC SECTOR) DARKEN UNDER KOREA, SINGAPORE AND THE UK.

The nations that build best are not the ones that deploy widest.

Diffusion is a separate race — and different countries are winning it.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

- 1 Are you deploying AI or just discussing it?
- 2 Which vertical is your real adoption engine?
- 3 Is exposure translating into realised output?

10

CHAPTER TEN

TRAJECTORY & MOMENTUM

Not who leads — who is improving fastest.

WHO IS IMPROVING FASTEST

A snapshot ranks the present. Trajectory ranks the future. This pillar reads the velocities — compute, capital, capability, throughput — and adds one metric the incumbents omit.

THE VELOCITIES — ANNUAL GROWTH (2025)

SIGNAL	ANNUAL GROWTH
Frontier training compute	~5x / year
AI-chip stock	~3.4x / year
Capability frontier	~14 points / year
Chip performance per dollar	+49% / year
US private investment	+160% since 2024
China private investment	+32% since 2024
China token throughput	140T / day

ANNUAL GROWTH RATES. SOURCES: EPOCH AI, TRENDS IN AI 2026 (OPEN DATA) (COMPUTE AND CAPABILITY, OPEN), STANFORD HAI, 2026 AI INDEX (CAPITAL), CHINA NATIONAL DATA ADMINISTRATION, 2026 (VIA SCMP/FORTUNE) (THROUGHPUT).

The open velocities are unambiguous and reproducible: frontier training compute is growing about 5x a year, the AI-chip stock 3.4x, chip performance-per-dollar 49%, and the capability frontier roughly 14 points a year. Capital is diverging — US private investment grew 160% since 2024 against China's 32% — while China's token throughput has gone vertical, from 100 billion a day at the start of 2024 to 140 trillion now, the clearest signal of an economy being rebuilt around inference.

CAPITAL-TO-CAPABILITY CONVERSION (2025)

POWER	PRIVATE CAPITAL 2025	CAPABILITY	CONVERSION PER DOLLAR
United States	\$285.9B (23x)	frontier lead ~2.7%	baseline
China	\$12.4B (1x)	near-parity	far higher

311 CONSTRUCT. CHINA REACHES NEAR-PARITY ON ~1/23 THE PRIVATE CAPITAL. INPUTS: STANFORD HAI, 2026 AI INDEX.

Which yields the pillar's signature metric — capital-to-capability conversion, a 311 construct. China reaches near-parity on roughly one twenty-third of the private capital, so its conversion of money into capability is far higher than the leader's. The flywheel — compute drives capability drives adoption drives capital drives compute — is turning for both powers, but it is turning more efficiently for the challenger. That, not the size of the cheque, is the leading indicator to watch.

PREDICTION

► HOLD

65% estimate · 2027

China's capital-to-capability conversion stays materially above the US's through 2027.

BASIS

2.7% gap on ~1/23 the private capital. Open-weight efficiency. State-directed inference build-out

TRIPWIRE

The US regains a >5% capability lead while its spending advantage holds

Direction beats position: the flywheel, not the snapshot, is the thing to watch. A nation improving its conversion of compute and capital into capability will pass a richer rival that is not, and it is that rate of change, not today's rank, that the trajectory pillar is built to catch.

Grouped into blocs, the same field resolves into a familiar geopolitics: two poles, a regulator, a hardware belt, a cluster of small high-intensity states, a capital-rich Gulf buying in, and a talent factory that exports. Each region plays the pillar it is strongest on.

THE BOARD BY REGION

REGION	ANCHOR	THE REGIONAL STORY
North America	US #1	The capital-and-compute pole. Canada a research feeder.
Greater China	China #2	State-built near-parity, at a fraction of the cost.
Western Europe	UK #4	Regulates first. Research-deep but thin on scale.
East Asia	Korea #5	Hardware and compute intensity. Japan and Taiwan alongside.
Southeast Asia	Singapore #3	The small-state model: governance and intensity, not scale.
The Gulf	UAE #9	Buying in fast with sovereign capital and cheap power.
South Asia	India #16	The talent factory — a deep pipeline that it exports.

THE SEVEN BLOCS THAT ORGANISE THE FIELD, EACH ANCHORED BY ITS HIGHEST-RANKED ECONOMY. RANKS FROM THE 311 COMPOSITE. REGIONAL CHARACTER FROM THE PILLAR CHAPTERS.

The leading indicators favour the efficient, not only the rich.

Direction, converted to output, decides the next decade.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

- 1 Is your position improving or eroding?
- 2 What is your capital-to-capability conversion?
- 3 Which velocity is yours to lose?



CHAPTER ELEVEN


COUNTRY PROFILES

The shapes behind the ranking.

THE SHAPES BEHIND THE RANKING

The ranking in Part One says who leads. The profiles say why. Each nation reads as a shape across the five live pillars — and the gaps in that shape are where national strategy has room to work.

The 311 AI Power Index, mapped



THE 93-NATION COMPOSITE AS GEOGRAPHY — DARKER IS HIGHER. THE CONCENTRATION IS THE STORY: TWO DARK POLES, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, ON A PALE FIELD. SOURCE: 311 COMPOSITE. BASE MAP NATURAL EARTH. SMALL HIGH-SCORING STATES (SINGAPORE, THE UAE, LUXEMBOURG) ARE TOO SMALL TO READ AT THIS SCALE — SEE THEIR PROFILES IN THE ATLAS.

The map makes a point the table cannot. AI power is not spread thin across many contenders. It is concentrated in two dark poles, with a scatter of mid-tone specialists — Western Europe, the Gulf, the richer economies of East Asia — and a pale developing field behind. Geography still shapes the race: compute clusters where power and capital are cheap, and the talent clusters where the compute already is. The profiles that follow show each nation's shape within that geography.

The profiles read as shapes. The American polygon is near-complete — a full capability pentagon with a single governance notch. The Chinese shape is state-built: strong on compute and strategy, thinner on the commercial layer that turns capability into products. Singapore's is the inverse of

scale — a governance-and-intensity spike on a modest capability base. The pack behind each spikes on two or three pillars and falls away on the rest, which is precisely where national strategy has room to move a rank.

One caveat the index states in the open: the #3 slot is weighting-dependent. On 311's compute-, capital- and governance-weighted composite, Singapore is third. On Stanford's open, R&D- and talent-weighted Vibrancy index, India is third. Neither is wrong — they measure different things — and the method section shows the two side by side.

The atlas that follows profiles every one of the 93 ranked economies in turn, two to a page and in rank order. Each carries its pillar shape (the radar), its 311 rank and composite score, its tier, and its five sub-pillar scores on a common 0-100 scale — so any nation can be read against any other, and against the leaders, on identical axes.

Below the leading pack the field thins into three bands, visible in the full league in Part One: capable specialists (the established economies of Europe and Asia, and the Gulf's strategy-led states), a broad developing field where institutional commitment runs ahead of built capability, and the base of the table. The strategic question is the same the whole way down — convert a narrow strength into a broad one before the window closes, or remain a capable specialist in a world defined by the two powers.

Read each profile the same way. The radar traces the nation across the five live pillars on a common 0-100 scale, so a full pentagon is a full-stack power and a spike is a specialist. The value beside each point gives the exact score. The rank pill and composite fix the nation in the league, and the short read below names its shape — strongest pillar, weakest, and how far it sits below the frontier.

Used together, the atlas answers a strategic question the league alone cannot: not just where a nation sits, but why, and what would move it. A country that trails on the composite but spikes on one pillar has a base to build from. One that is flat across all five faces a harder climb. The gaps in a shape are the levers, and the profiles are ordered so any nation can be read against the peers immediately above and below it.



United States

Full-stack tier

#1

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#1

RANK OF 93

94.7

COMPOSITE / 100

100th

PERCENTILE

LEADER

POINTS VS #1

The world's only full-stack AI power.

The United States holds the frontier on four of the five pillars at once — the leading foundation-model labs in OpenAI, Anthropic and Google DeepMind, roughly 5,400 AI data centres, the deepest venture market on earth, and the researchers the rest of the world trains and then loses to it. Only governance lags, where a deliberately light-touch federal posture leaves it eighth.

No other country combines the chips, the capital, the labs and the talent simultaneously, and that breadth is the moat. Rivals can match one input at a time, not the whole stack, so the United States sets the pace on every front rather than specialising in one.

It takes first place by 25 points, a margin wider than the spread across the entire rest of the top ten. Its one soft spot, governance, is the pillar that least constrains frontier capability, so it caps the score without ever threatening the rank.



China

Full-stack tier

#2

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#2

RANK OF 93

69.4

COMPOSITE / 100

99th

PERCENTILE

-25.3

POINTS VS #1

Near-parity at a fraction of the cost.

China trails the United States only narrowly on the composite while leading the world on patent volume, training the largest single share of top researchers, and shipping open models in DeepSeek, Qwen and Kimi that sit close to the Western frontier — all under export controls that throttle its access to leading-edge accelerators.

It is the only economy that contests the leader on capability itself rather than on a single niche, and it does so far more cheaply. That is what makes the two-power framing real rather than rhetorical: a genuine second pole, not a distant runner-up.

It ranks second, under three points of frontier capability behind the United States while spending roughly twenty-three times less. The distance is widest on capital and the commercial layer, so its climb runs through monetisation and chip access, not through catching up in research.



Singapore

Specialist tier

#3

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#3

RANK OF 93

40.2

COMPOSITE / 100

98th

PERCENTILE

-54.5

POINTS VS #1

The small-state model, built on governance.

Singapore has neither domestic energy nor scale, yet it hosts one of the densest data-centre clusters on earth, anchors South-East Asia's subsea-cable and cloud traffic, and pairs that infrastructure with the region's clearest national AI strategy and adoption rules.

It proves a city-state can reach the top tier without fabricating a chip or training a frontier model, by supplying the connectivity, trust and governance that de-risk everyone else's compute. Strategy, not size, buys its place.

It ranks third on 311's compute-, capital- and governance-weighted composite, carried by governance and infrastructure intensity. Because the placing rests on those pillars rather than raw capability, it is the most weighting-sensitive position in the whole table.



United Kingdom

#4

Leading tier

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#4

RANK OF 93

33.0

COMPOSITE / 100

97th

PERCENTILE

-61.7

POINTS VS #1

Deep science, thin scale.

The United Kingdom holds genuine research and safety weight — Google DeepMind and Isomorphic in London, the first state AI Safety Institute, and a strong university pipeline — but its compute base and domestic capital are a fraction of the two leaders’.

It matters as the clearest case of a country that shapes the field through ideas and institutions rather than infrastructure. Its safety and standards work travels globally even where its hardware does not.

It ranks fourth, level on the composite with South Korea. The lever is compute and capital: the research is already world-class, so the rank moves only if the UK can host the scale its scientists currently have to go abroad to use.



South Korea

Leading tier

#5

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#5

RANK OF 93

33.0

COMPOSITE / 100

96th

PERCENTILE

-61.7

POINTS VS #1

A hardware power reaching upstream.

South Korea's strength is industrial — Samsung and SK Hynix supply much of the world's advanced memory, and the country runs high manufacturing and robot-density adoption — but its foundation-model and research layers are thinner than its chip base.

It shows that owning the hardware supply chain is a real and defensible form of AI power, distinct from building the models. When memory and packaging are chokepoints, Seoul sits on one of them.

It ranks joint-fourth, carried by compute and deployment. Its climb depends on converting hardware leadership into models and research, the softer pillars where it currently trails its own manufacturing strength.



France

Leading tier

#6

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#6

RANK OF 93

31.1

COMPOSITE / 100

95th

PERCENTILE

-63.6

POINTS VS #1

Europe's model-building exception.

France pairs a credible frontier lab in Mistral with Black Forest Labs, strong public research, and an aggressive push to host sovereign compute on low-carbon nuclear power — the most complete AI stack in the EU.

It matters because it is the one continental European economy trying to build at the frontier rather than only regulate it, giving the EU a domestic answer to the American labs.

It ranks sixth, its profile more balanced than most of the pack. The gap to the leaders is scale of capital and compute, not capability or strategy, so its rank turns on whether European funding can match its ambition.



Israel

Leading tier

#7

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#7

RANK OF 93

30.5

COMPOSITE / 100

93rd

PERCENTILE

-64.2

POINTS VS #1

Venture intensity without the scale.

Israel ranks far above its size on capital and research — the densest AI venture ecosystem per head in the world, deep defence-driven talent, and an outsized share of applied AI startups relative to a population under ten million.

It is the clearest proof that concentration can substitute for scale: a small country can hold a top-ten position on the strength of its funding intensity and researcher quality alone.

It ranks seventh, carried by capital and research. Its ceiling is domestic compute and market size, so its position is durable at the top of the mid-tier but structurally capped below the scale powers.



Canada

Leading tier

#8

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



#8

RANK OF 93

28.7

COMPOSITE / 100

92nd

PERCENTILE

-66

POINTS VS #1

A research founder that exports its talent.

Canada seeded modern deep learning — the Toronto, Montreal and Alberta institutes and the researchers who built the field — and retains strong public research, but much of the commercial value and talent it produces migrates south.

It matters as a talent factory for the frontier: its universities and labs shape the researchers who then staff American companies, giving it influence over the field disproportionate to its own industry.

It ranks eighth, strong on research and talent, weaker on capital and compute. The lever is retention and commercialisation — keeping at home the people and companies its research base creates.



UAE

Emerging tier

#9

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#9

RANK OF 93

26.8

COMPOSITE / 100

91st

PERCENTILE

-67.9

POINTS VS #1

Buying in with sovereign capital.

The UAE is converting oil wealth and cheap power into AI position fast — the Falcon open models from TII, sovereign compute build-outs, and state funds acquiring stakes across the global stack — from a small domestic research base.

It matters as the template for capital-led entry: a country with no legacy AI ecosystem using sovereign money and energy to buy its way into the top tier within a few years.

It ranks ninth, carried by capital and top-ranked governance rather than home-grown capability. Its trajectory is the steepest in the table, but its rank rests on continued spending and on turning imported compute into domestic research.



Germany

Emerging tier

#10

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#10

RANK OF 93

26.4

COMPOSITE / 100

90th

PERCENTILE

-68.3

POINTS VS #1

Industrial strength, software lag.

Germany's AI weight sits in its industrial base — Helsing in defence AI, Aleph Alpha in enterprise models, and deep manufacturing adoption — but its foundation-model and venture layers trail its economic size.

It matters as the test of whether Europe's largest industrial economy can turn applied, factory-floor AI strength into frontier capability rather than remaining a heavy adopter of others' models.

It ranks tenth. The gap is research depth and capital velocity. Its industrial adoption is real, but the rank moves only if that translates into models and funding at frontier scale.



Japan

Emerging tier

#11

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#11

RANK OF 93

25.9

COMPOSITE / 100

89th

PERCENTILE

-68.8

POINTS VS #1

Compute and robotics, quiet on models.

Japan combines serious compute infrastructure, world-leading robotics and industrial automation, and government-backed sovereign-model efforts, but its foundation-model and research output is modest for the size of its economy.

It matters because it holds two scarce inputs — advanced hardware and physical-AI deployment — even as it under-indexes on the software frontier, a distinctive and defensible mix.

It ranks eleventh, strong on compute and deployment, weak on research and talent. Its lever is the model and research layer, where decades of caution have left it behind its own hardware strength.



Switzerland

Emerging tier

#12

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#12

RANK OF 93

25.4

COMPOSITE / 100

88th

PERCENTILE

-69.3

POINTS VS #1

Research density on a tiny base.

Switzerland punches far above its size on research and talent — ETH Zurich and EPFL, a concentration of AI labs, and Google's largest research presence outside the United States — with little domestic compute or venture scale.

It shows that elite research institutions can secure a top-tier position for a country of nine million, supplying ideas and researchers to the global frontier well beyond its economic weight.

It ranks twelfth, strong on research, weak on capital and compute. Its ceiling is scale: the science is world-class, but the frontier is built where the chips and the capital are, not where the papers are written.



Netherlands

Emerging tier

#13

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#13

RANK OF 93

24.6

COMPOSITE / 100

87th

PERCENTILE

-70.1

POINTS VS #1

The other chokepoint: the machines that make the chips.

The Netherlands is home to ASML, the sole maker of the EUV lithography machines every advanced fab depends on, alongside a dense data-centre and connectivity hub around Amsterdam.

With Taiwan it forms the second half of the chip chokepoint — Taiwan makes the chips, the Netherlands makes the machines that make the chips. That is quiet, decisive leverage over the entire hardware layer.

It ranks thirteenth, its infrastructure and governance ahead of its home-grown model and research base. Its influence, like Taiwan's, is structural rather than something the composite fully captures.



Saudi Arabia

Emerging tier

#14

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#14

RANK OF 93

23.0

COMPOSITE / 100

86th

PERCENTILE

-71.7

POINTS VS #1

Oil capital, redirected to compute.

Saudi Arabia is deploying sovereign wealth into AI at speed — data-centre build-outs, stakes across the global stack through the Public Investment Fund, and Arabic-language model efforts — from almost no prior research base.

With the UAE it defines the Gulf's capital-led entry: buying position with money and cheap energy rather than building it over decades. Whether that converts to durable capability is the open question.

It ranks fourteenth, carried by capital and governance ambition rather than home-grown capability. Its rank depends on sustained spending and on turning purchased compute into domestic research and talent.



Taiwan

Emerging tier

#15

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#15

RANK OF 93

23.0

COMPOSITE / 100

85th

PERCENTILE

-71.7

POINTS VS #1

The foundry the whole field runs on.

Taiwan makes almost all of the world's leading-edge AI chips through TSMC, the single most important node in the global supply chain, while its own model, research and capital layers stay modest.

It holds the most concentrated chokepoint in AI — no frontier chip ships without it — which gives a mid-sized economy structural leverage over every other nation's compute, the United States and China included.

It ranks fifteenth, far higher on compute than its size implies. The paradox is that its true leverage does not show fully in a scored ranking, because fabrication is a supply-chain fact more than a weighted pillar.



India

Emerging tier

#16

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#16

RANK OF 93

22.5

COMPOSITE / 100

84th

PERCENTILE

-72.2

POINTS VS #1

The pipeline that exports its best.

India has the deepest and fastest-growing AI talent pipeline outside the two leaders and a vast services industry deploying AI at scale, but it produces relatively few frontier researchers who stay and little domestic frontier compute.

It matters as the world's largest AI talent source in the making — the country that trains and supplies engineers to the global industry, even as it captures a small share of the frontier value itself.

It ranks sixteenth on 311's weighting and third on Stanford's talent-weighted Vibrancy index, the clearest illustration of how much the method matters. Its lever is retention and domestic compute, turning a labour pool into a capability base.



Finland

Emerging tier

#17

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



#17

RANK OF 93

21.8

COMPOSITE / 100

83rd

PERCENTILE

-72.9

POINTS VS #1

Green power and a deep-tech heritage.

Finland pairs abundant clean electricity and a cool climate ideal for data centres with a strong engineering base and public AI-literacy programmes, though its model and venture layers are small.

It is a natural host for European sovereign compute — cheap green energy is the scarce input in the AI build-out, and Finland has it in surplus.

It ranks seventeenth, above its size on the compute and governance side. Its lever is attracting the capital and the models to run on the power it can supply.



Norway

Emerging tier

#18

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#18

RANK OF 93

20.8

COMPOSITE / 100

82nd

PERCENTILE

-73.9

POINTS VS #1

Hydropower looking for compute to run.

Norway offers some of the cheapest clean electricity in the world from hydropower, plus sovereign-fund capital, but almost no domestic AI research or model-building base.

In an AI economy gated by power, abundant cheap green energy is a genuine asset — Norway can host frontier-scale training it could never design itself.

It ranks eighteenth, carried by the compute-hosting potential its energy implies. Its rank moves only once that potential is built out and paired with capability it currently lacks.



Sweden

Emerging tier

#19

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



#19

RANK OF 93

20.1

COMPOSITE / 100

80th

PERCENTILE

-74.6

POINTS VS #1

Industrial AI with a startup edge.

Sweden combines a strong industrial base, a productive startup ecosystem for its size and clean power, with credible applied-AI adoption across manufacturing and enterprise.

It is the most balanced of the Nordics — not dominant on any pillar, but competent across several, the profile of a small advanced economy using AI well rather than building the frontier.

It ranks nineteenth. Its path up is scale of capital and research, the pillars where its competence has not yet turned into frontier weight.



Denmark

Emerging tier

#20

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#20

RANK OF 93

19.9

COMPOSITE / 100

79th

PERCENTILE

-74.8

POINTS VS #1

Governed adoption, modest scale.

Denmark leads on public-sector digitisation and AI governance and adopts applied AI widely, but its compute, research and capital bases are small.

It typifies the well-run small state — high trust, clear rules and strong adoption substitute for scale, earning a high placing without frontier capability.

It ranks twentieth, carried by governance. Its ceiling is structural: a small economy turns governance strength into rank, but not into the compute and capital the frontier demands.



Australia

Emerging tier

#21

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#21

RANK OF 93

19.1

COMPOSITE / 100

78th

PERCENTILE

-75.6

POINTS VS #1

Strong research, distant from the frontier.

Australia has solid universities and AI research, critical minerals for the hardware supply chain, and growing data-centre investment, but limited domestic model-building and a small venture market for its economy.

It matters as a resource-and-research partner to the Western bloc more than as a builder — its minerals feed the hardware chain and its researchers the labs abroad.

It ranks twenty-first. The lever is capital and models: the research base is real, but distance and market size keep the frontier elsewhere.



Spain

Emerging tier

#22

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#22

RANK OF 93

19.0

COMPOSITE / 100

77th

PERCENTILE

-75.7

POINTS VS #1

Southern Europe's adoption hub.

Spain is attracting significant data-centre investment, runs a growing AI startup scene, and adopts AI across services and tourism, though its research and model layers trail the EU leaders.

It is emerging as a southern-European compute and adoption base, drawing infrastructure that once defaulted to the north on the strength of land, power and connectivity.

It ranks twenty-second. Its climb depends on turning inbound data-centre capital into domestic research and companies rather than hosting others' compute.



Ireland

Emerging tier

#23

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#23

RANK OF 93

18.9

COMPOSITE / 100

76th

PERCENTILE

-75.8

POINTS VS #1

Everyone's European headquarters.

Ireland hosts the European operations of the major US tech and AI firms and a dense data-centre cluster, but the capability is largely foreign-owned, with a modest indigenous research and model base.

It shows how tax and hosting policy can concentrate the industry's European presence in one small country — real infrastructure and employment, built on others' capability.

It ranks twenty-third, its compute and capital figures lifted by foreign presence. The open question is how much of that hosted capability is genuinely Irish.



Malaysia

Emerging tier

#24

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#24

RANK OF 93

18.3

COMPOSITE / 100

75th

PERCENTILE

-76.4

POINTS VS #1

South-East Asia's new data-centre frontier.

Malaysia, and Johor in particular, is absorbing a wave of data-centre investment spilling over from constrained Singapore, backed by cheaper land and power, though its research and model base is early.

It is becoming the overflow host for South-East Asian compute — where the region's data centres go when Singapore runs out of room and power.

It ranks twenty-fourth, rising on inbound infrastructure. Its lever is converting host status into domestic capability rather than remaining a location for others' hardware.



Brazil

Nascent tier

#25

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#25

RANK OF 93

17.8

COMPOSITE / 100

74th

PERCENTILE

-76.9

POINTS VS #1

Latin America's anchor, scale without the frontier.

Brazil has the region's largest AI talent pool and market, a growing startup scene and a national AI strategy, but limited frontier compute and research relative to its size.

It matters as Latin America's centre of gravity — where the region's talent, adoption and policy concentrate, even as the frontier is built far away.

It ranks twenty-fifth, first in its region. The lever is compute and research investment to match its human and market scale.



Iceland

Nascent tier

#26

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93
COUNTRY

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#26

RANK OF 93

17.6

COMPOSITE / 100

73rd

PERCENTILE

-77.1

POINTS VS #1

Pure green power, pure host.

Iceland offers near-limitless cheap geothermal and hydro power and a cool climate, making it one of the most efficient data-centre locations on earth, with essentially no domestic AI research base.

It is the clearest case of energy as AI power — a tiny nation with no models or labs that matters because it can run compute cheaper and greener than almost anywhere.

It ranks twenty-sixth, carried almost entirely by its compute-hosting potential. It is a host, not a builder, and the rank reflects exactly that.



Luxembourg

Nascent tier

#27

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93 COUNTRY

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#27

RANK OF 93

17.4

COMPOSITE / 100

72nd

PERCENTILE

-77.3

POINTS VS #1

Finance capital, small footprint.

Luxembourg brings deep financial capital, strong connectivity and EU institutional weight, but a very small research, talent and model base.

It shows a finance-and-governance hub can hold a mid-table place through capital and connectivity alone, without frontier capability.

It ranks twenty-seventh, carried by capital and governance on a tiny base. Its ceiling is size — there is no domestic scale to build capability on.



Estonia

Nascent tier

#28

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93
COUNTRY

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#28

RANK OF 93

17.1

COMPOSITE / 100

71st

PERCENTILE

-77.6

POINTS VS #1

Digital government, outsized for its size.

Estonia runs one of the world's most advanced digital-government stacks and high AI adoption in public services, from a population of 1.3 million with a small research and compute base.

It is the benchmark for digital statecraft — proof that governance and adoption can place a tiny nation on the map even without the capability pillars.

It ranks twenty-eighth, carried by governance. Its rank is a governance story, structurally capped by the scale it does not have.



Russia

Nascent tier

#29

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#29

RANK OF 93

16.6

COMPOSITE / 100

70th

PERCENTILE

-78.1

POINTS VS #1

Isolated capability, sanctioned and shrinking.

Russia retains a mathematical and research heritage and state AI ambitions, but sanctions, chip-access cuts and a talent exodus since 2022 have hollowed out its ability to build at the frontier.

It matters as the clearest case of AI power in retreat — real historic capability now severed from the chips, capital and talent flows the frontier depends on.

It ranks twenty-ninth and drifting lower, its research base intact on paper but cut off in practice. The gap is access, not aptitude, and access is still closing.


Italy

Nascent tier


#30

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93
COUNTRY

0-100



— COUNTRY — AVERAGE — LEADER — FIELD DENSITY



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#30

RANK OF 93

16.5

COMPOSITE / 100

68th

PERCENTILE

-78.2

POINTS VS #1

Industrial base, software lag.

Italy has a large manufacturing economy adopting applied AI and a national strategy, but a thin research, model and venture layer for the size of its economy.

It is a heavy adopter more than a builder — its AI weight sits in factories and enterprise, not in labs or startups.

It ranks thirtieth. Its lever is research and capital, converting industrial adoption into capability rather than importing the models it runs.



Austria

Nascent tier

#31

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#31

RANK OF 93

16.4

COMPOSITE / 100

67th

PERCENTILE

-78.3

POINTS VS #1

Competent, mid-tier, unspecialised.

Austria has solid research institutions, strong industrial adoption and clean power, but no standout pillar and a small model and venture base.

It is a capable mid-tier European economy using AI well without leading on any dimension — the broad middle of the developed field.

It ranks thirty-first. With no single spike to build on, its climb depends on broadening across research and capital together.


Greece

Nascent tier


#32

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93
COUNTRY

0-100



— COUNTRY — AVERAGE — LEADER — FIELD DENSITY



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#32

RANK OF 93

16.1

COMPOSITE / 100

66th

PERCENTILE

-78.6

POINTS VS #1

Mediterranean adoption, rising infrastructure.

Greece is drawing data-centre and cloud investment, notably from Microsoft, and adopting AI across tourism, shipping and services, on a modest research and model base.

It is a southern-European entrant turning location and inbound infrastructure into digital capacity rather than building at the frontier.

It ranks thirty-second. The lever is domestic research and capital on top of the inbound compute.


Qatar

Nascent tier


#33

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93
COUNTRY

0-100



— COUNTRY — AVERAGE — LEADER — FIELD DENSITY



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#33

RANK OF 93

16.0

COMPOSITE / 100

65th

PERCENTILE

-78.7

POINTS VS #1

Sovereign capital, importing the research.

Qatar is converting gas wealth into AI position — sovereign-fund investment, data-centre build-outs, and in 2026 hosting imec's first Middle East hub to bring world-leading chip research onshore — from a negligible domestic research base.

It shows the Gulf model taken a step past buying compute, to buying access to the research itself. Capital substitutes for a capability base the country does not yet have.

It ranks thirty-third, carried by capital and governance rather than home-grown capability. Its trajectory depends on whether imported research and infrastructure seed a domestic ecosystem or stay a hosted presence.



Belgium

Nascent tier

#34

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93
COUNTRY

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#34

RANK OF 93

15.9

COMPOSITE / 100

64th

PERCENTILE

-78.8

POINTS VS #1

Europe's chip-research linchpin.

Belgium is home to imec, the institute often called the chip lab of the world. Its \$2.7 billion NanoLC pilot line (2.5 billion euros) houses ASML's High-NA EUV machine, it convenes more than 600 industry partners, and its sub-2-nanometre process work underpins the chips Amazon, Microsoft, Google and the foundries will build next.

It holds a rare form of AI power, not models or capital but the pre-competitive research the entire advanced-chip industry, and therefore all frontier compute, is built on. imec sits at the centre of the EU Chips Act and the West's answer to Asian fabrication.

It ranks thirty-fourth on the composite, well below its true leverage, because a shared research institute's grip on the hardware layer is not something a pillar-weighted index captures. On chip R&D specifically, few countries matter more.



New Zealand

Nascent tier

#35

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#35

RANK OF 93

15.6

COMPOSITE / 100

63rd

PERCENTILE

-79.1

POINTS VS #1

Small, advanced, and remote.

New Zealand has strong research institutions, high digital adoption and applied AI in agritech and services, but a small population and market, limited domestic compute, and distance from the major AI centres.

It is a capable, well-governed small advanced economy applying AI to its strengths in agriculture and public services rather than competing at the frontier, with distance a structural constraint.

It ranks thirty-fifth. The lever is scale — capital, compute and market size — which a small, remote economy cannot easily manufacture.



Hungary

Nascent tier

#36

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#36

RANK OF 93

15.5

COMPOSITE / 100

62nd

PERCENTILE

-79.2

POINTS VS #1

Industrial AI in Central Europe.

Hungary's AI weight sits in its large automotive and manufacturing base, where German carmakers run applied AI on the factory floor, more than in domestic research or model-building.

It is an adopter economy: AI arrives through the supply chains of the industry it hosts rather than through home-grown labs.

It ranks thirty-sixth. The lever is research and capital of its own, not the applied AI it imports with foreign manufacturing.



Poland

Nascent tier

#37

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#37

RANK OF 93

15.4

COMPOSITE / 100

61st

PERCENTILE

-79.3

POINTS VS #1

Central Europe's engineering hub.

Poland is the largest Central European tech economy — a deep software-engineering talent pool, a growing startup scene that produced the voice-AI firm ElevenLabs, and rising data-centre investment — though frontier research and capital trail Western Europe.

It is the engineering backbone of Central Europe, supplying developers and increasingly startups to the European AI industry with a scale the smaller CEE states lack.

It ranks thirty-seventh. The lever is capital and research depth, turning a strong talent base and startup momentum into frontier-level capability.



Vietnam

Nascent tier

#38

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



#38

RANK OF 93

15.2

COMPOSITE / 100

60th

PERCENTILE

-79.5

POINTS VS #1

South-East Asia's rising AI factory.

Vietnam has drawn Nvidia's third global R&D centre and an AI data centre, FPT's \$200 million Nvidia-powered AI factory in Hanoi, and Viettel's military-run AI compute, on the back of a young STEM workforce and a national AI priority. Its data-centre capacity is set to double to a gigawatt by 2030.

It is emerging as the region's manufacturing-and-talent base for AI, the place Nvidia and the hyperscalers extend their supply and compute chains as South-East Asian demand surges.

It ranks thirty-eighth, rising fast on inbound compute and talent partnerships. Its lever is turning hosted infrastructure and a large labour pool into domestic models and research.



Lithuania

Nascent tier

#39

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93
COUNTRY

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#39

RANK OF 93

14.9

COMPOSITE / 100

59th

PERCENTILE

-79.8

POINTS VS #1

A Baltic fintech and deep-tech niche.

Lithuania combines a fast-built fintech licensing hub, a niche in lasers and photonics, and strong digital government, on a very small population and research base.

It shows a small Baltic state can carve a defensible niche in specific technologies and financial infrastructure rather than competing across the board.

It ranks thirty-ninth. Its ceiling is scale, and its lever is deepening the niches it already leads.


Slovenia

Nascent tier


#40

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93
COUNTRY

0-100



— COUNTRY — AVERAGE — LEADER — FIELD DENSITY



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#40

RANK OF 93

14.8

COMPOSITE / 100

58th

PERCENTILE

-79.9

POINTS VS #1

Small, research-tidy, industrial.

Slovenia pairs solid research institutions and an AI-focused UNESCO centre with an industrial economy, on a population of two million.

It is a competent small European economy with research above its weight, held back only by the scale to act on it.

It ranks fortieth. The lever is capital and compute, which a small economy struggles to assemble alone.



Thailand

Nascent tier

#41

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#41

RANK OF 93

14.6

COMPOSITE / 100

57th

PERCENTILE

-80.1

POINTS VS #1

South-East Asia's next data-centre draw.

Thailand is attracting cloud-region and data-centre investment from the hyperscalers, backed by a national AI plan and a large manufacturing and tourism economy, with a thin research base.

It is positioning as a regional compute and adoption hub in mainland South-East Asia, riding the same wave pulling infrastructure into the region.

It ranks forty-first. The lever is converting inbound infrastructure into domestic research and capability.



Portugal

Nascent tier

#42

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#42

RANK OF 93

14.5

COMPOSITE / 100

55th

PERCENTILE

-80.2

POINTS VS #1

Lisbon's outsized draw.

Portugal punches above its size through Lisbon's rise as a European tech magnet — host of a major tech summit, home to firms like Unbabel, cheap talent and rising data-centre interest — on a small research and capital base.

It shows how quality of life and openness can concentrate talent and startups in a small country, making Lisbon a European hub out of proportion to Portugal's economic weight.

It ranks forty-second. The lever is domestic research and capital, to convert inbound talent and events into durable home-grown capability.



Bahrain

Nascent tier

#43

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



#43

RANK OF 93

14.4

COMPOSITE / 100

54th

PERCENTILE

-80.3

POINTS VS #1

Cloud-first Gulf, small and early.

Bahrain was the Gulf's first mover to a cloud-first government and hosted an early regional cloud region, but its scale, research and model base are small.

It shows a small Gulf state can lead on cloud-and-governance posture ahead of its larger neighbours, if not on capability.

It ranks forty-third, carried by governance and adoption. Its ceiling is size and a limited domestic base.



Czech Rep.

Nascent tier

#44

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#44

RANK OF 93

14.0

COMPOSITE / 100

53rd

PERCENTILE

-80.7

POINTS VS #1

Industrial base, research pockets.

The Czech Republic combines a strong industrial and automotive economy with pockets of research and a notable cybersecurity and software sector, ahead of its model-building layer.

It is a capable Central European industrial economy applying AI in industry and security rather than building at the frontier.

It ranks forty-fourth. The lever is research depth and capital to match its industrial strength.



Chile

Nascent tier

#45

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#45

RANK OF 93

13.9

COMPOSITE / 100

52nd

PERCENTILE

-80.8

POINTS VS #1

Latin America's AI leader.

Chile tops the Latin American AI Index two years running, ranks as the region's most innovative economy, and pairs more than sixty percent renewable electricity, the region's most advanced 5G and Pacific submarine cables with AWS and Google builds in Santiago.

It shows a mid-sized economy can lead a continent on AI through green energy, connectivity and policy maturity rather than scale — the Southern Cone's compute and research anchor.

It ranks forty-fifth globally and first in Latin America on maturity. The lever is scale of capital and talent, to turn regional leadership into global weight.



Indonesia

Nascent tier

#46

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#46

RANK OF 93

13.2

COMPOSITE / 100

51st

PERCENTILE

-81.5

POINTS VS #1

Sovereign AI for 280 million.

Indonesia launched its first sovereign AI data centre in 2024 and an AI Centre of Excellence with Nvidia, Cisco and Indosat in 2025, backed by Microsoft's \$1.7 billion cloud pledge, a 360-megawatt Nvidia campus in Batam, and a national strategy, Golden Vision 2045, for a market of 280 million people.

It is the largest test of sovereign, telco-led AI in the developing world, building localised compute and national models to keep data and strategy onshore rather than defaulting to the American hyperscalers.

It ranks forty-sixth, its population and inbound investment ahead of its current research and model base. The lever is converting sovereign infrastructure into home-grown capability at the scale its market implies.



Romania

Nascent tier

#47

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#47

RANK OF 93

12.8

COMPOSITE / 100

50th

PERCENTILE

-81.9

POINTS VS #1

Deep dev talent, an RPA success.

Romania has one of Central Europe's largest software-engineering pools and produced UiPath, the automation firm that became a global success, though frontier research and compute stay modest.

It shows the region's engineering depth can produce world-scale software companies, even without a domestic frontier-compute base.

It ranks forty-seventh. The lever is capital and research to turn talent and one breakout into a broader ecosystem.



Philippines

Nascent tier

#48

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#48

RANK OF 93

12.7

COMPOSITE / 100

49th

PERCENTILE

-82

POINTS VS #1

The services economy meets AI.

The Philippines anchors the world's largest business-process-outsourcing industry, now the front line of AI's impact on services, alongside a young English-speaking workforce and a national AI roadmap, on a small compute and research base.

It is the clearest test of AI's effect on services work — a country whose economy rests on the very tasks automation targets first, racing to move up the value chain before it is displaced.

It ranks forty-eighth, its human scale ahead of its infrastructure. The lever is reskilling and compute, turning a services workforce into AI-augmented capability rather than a displaced one.



Egypt

Nascent tier

#49

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



#49

RANK OF 93

12.5

COMPOSITE / 100

48th

PERCENTILE

-82.2

POINTS VS #1

North Africa's AI hub.

Egypt is North Africa's leading AI player — a large young talent pool, government-backed digital transformation, regulatory alignment with the EU, and a share of the Nvidia-powered data-centre build-out spreading across the region — and it helped lead African venture deal flow in 2025.

It matters as the bridge between the Arab world, Africa and Europe: a large-population hub positioning itself as the regional base for AI talent and infrastructure across three markets.

It ranks forty-ninth, its talent and strategy ahead of its compute and capital. The lever is turning a large workforce and regional position into domestic models and infrastructure.



Turkey

Nascent tier

#50

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#50

RANK OF 93

12.3

COMPOSITE / 100

47th

PERCENTILE

-82.4

POINTS VS #1

Defence-industry AI, turned to statecraft.

Turkey is building AI off its defence base — Baykar's autonomous Kizilelma fighter and KEMANKES AI cruise missile, and systems from STM, Havelsan and Aselsan — alongside sovereign Turkish-language models in the T3 Foundation's T3 AI and TUBITAK's Bilge, and a 2026-30 national AI action plan.

It is the clearest case of a country porting hard-won defence-tech success into AI. Autonomous weapons gave it a real, exported capability, and it is trying to repeat the trick in language models and public-sector AI.

It ranks fiftieth, its defence-AI strength not fully captured by a civilian-weighted composite. The lever is broadening from military autonomy and language models into the compute and capital the wider frontier demands.



Jordan

Nascent tier

#51

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#51

RANK OF 93

12.0

COMPOSITE / 100

46th

PERCENTILE

-82.7

POINTS VS #1

A young, educated MENA base.

Jordan has an educated young workforce, a growing Amman tech and gaming scene, and regional services links, on a small compute and research base.

It is a MENA talent-and-services base, supplying skills to the region more than building AI at home.

It ranks fifty-first. The lever is compute and capital to build on the talent.



Colombia

Nascent tier

#52

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#52

RANK OF 93

11.9

COMPOSITE / 100

45th

PERCENTILE

-82.8

POINTS VS #1

Bogota's rising cloud demand.

Colombia is a growing Latin American cloud and enterprise-adoption market with a national AI policy, drawing hyperscaler interest to Bogota, on a small research and model base.

It is an emerging Andean demand centre, where enterprise adoption and connectivity are pulling in cloud capacity.

It ranks fifty-second. The lever is domestic research and compute to build on the adoption.



Oman

Nascent tier

#53

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



#53

RANK OF 93

11.8

COMPOSITE / 100

43rd

PERCENTILE

-82.9

POINTS VS #1

A Gulf diversifier, cheap power.

Oman is using cheap energy and a diversification agenda to court data-centre and digital investment, from a small research and capability base.

It is a smaller Gulf entrant leaning on energy and location rather than the sovereign-capital scale of its neighbours.

It ranks fifty-third. The lever is turning energy and location into hosted compute and, eventually, capability.



Kuwait

Nascent tier

#54

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#54

RANK OF 93

11.8

COMPOSITE / 100

42nd

PERCENTILE

-82.9

POINTS VS #1

Oil wealth, slow digitisation.

Kuwait has deep sovereign wealth but has moved more slowly than its Gulf neighbours on digital and AI infrastructure, with a small domestic tech base.

It is the Gulf laggard on execution rather than capital: the money exists, the build-out and strategy trail the UAE, Saudi and Qatar.

It ranks fifty-fourth. The lever is execution, converting capital into infrastructure and strategy.



South Africa

Nascent tier

#55

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#55

RANK OF 93

11.7

COMPOSITE / 100

41st

PERCENTILE

-83

POINTS VS #1

The continent's compute anchor.

South Africa holds roughly seventy percent of Africa's data-centre capacity, the hyperscale cloud regions of AWS, Azure and Google, about 726 AI companies and the continent's largest tech-venture base, with Cassava deploying thousands of Nvidia GPUs and Microsoft committing hundreds of millions of dollars.

It is Africa's default compute and cloud hub — where the rest of the continent's AI workloads run and where the hyperscalers land first. That infrastructure lead anchors an emerging African AI economy.

It ranks fifty-fifth globally but first in Africa by a wide margin. Its lever is research and talent depth to match the infrastructure, turning hosted cloud into home-grown capability.



Uzbekistan

Nascent tier

#56

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#56

RANK OF 93

11.7

COMPOSITE / 100

40th

PERCENTILE

-83

POINTS VS #1

Central Asia's young digitiser.

Uzbekistan is pushing digital-government reform and IT-sector growth with a young population, from a very low research and compute base.

It is Central Asia's most active digitiser, building basic digital rails before AI capability.

It ranks fifty-sixth. The lever is the full stack, from connectivity and skills upward.



Serbia

Nascent tier

#57

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



#57

RANK OF 93

11.6

COMPOSITE / 100

39th

PERCENTILE

-83.1

POINTS VS #1

Balkan dev talent, a state AI push.

Serbia has a strong software-engineering pool, a state-backed AI institute in Belgrade and Microsoft engagement, ahead of its compute and capital base.

It is the Western Balkans' engineering hub, punching above its size on talent and government intent.

It ranks fifty-seventh. The lever is capital and compute to build on the talent.



Bulgaria

Nascent tier

#58

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#58

RANK OF 93

11.6

COMPOSITE / 100

38th

PERCENTILE

-83.1

POINTS VS #1

An outsourcing and IT base.

Bulgaria has a sizeable IT-outsourcing and software sector and low costs, with a small domestic research and model base.

It is a European near-shore engineering base more than an AI builder, supplying services to the continent.

It ranks fifty-eighth. The lever is moving up from outsourcing to research and products.


Peru

Nascent tier


#59

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93
COUNTRY

0-100



— COUNTRY — AVERAGE — LEADER — FIELD DENSITY



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#59

RANK OF 93

11.2

COMPOSITE / 100

37th

PERCENTILE

-83.5

POINTS VS #1

Andean mid-tier, early days.

Peru has a resource-heavy economy, growing connectivity and early AI policy, with a small research, capital and compute base.

It sits in the Andean middle, where AI is arriving through enterprise and mining rather than domestic capability.

It ranks fifty-ninth. The lever is the whole capability stack, from research to compute.



Latvia

Nascent tier

#60

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#60

RANK OF 93

11.0

COMPOSITE / 100

36th

PERCENTILE

-83.7

POINTS VS #1

A small Baltic digitiser.

Latvia has strong digital government and connectivity for its size, with a very small research and compute base.

It is a competent Baltic digital state whose ceiling is scale rather than governance.

It ranks sixtieth. The lever is capital and talent it cannot easily grow alone.



Slovakia

Nascent tier

#61

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#61

RANK OF 93

10.9

COMPOSITE / 100

35th

PERCENTILE

-83.8

POINTS VS #1

Auto manufacturing, thin software.

Slovakia's economy leans heavily on automotive manufacturing, adopting applied AI in industry, with a thin research and model layer.

It is an industrial adopter, like several of its Central European neighbours, rather than a builder.

It ranks sixty-first. The lever is research and capital beyond the factory floor.



Malta

Nascent tier

#62

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#62

RANK OF 93

10.8

COMPOSITE / 100

34th

PERCENTILE

-83.9

POINTS VS #1

Tiny, finance-and-gaming.

Malta's economy centres on finance, iGaming and EU services, with almost no domestic AI research or compute base.

It shows a micro-state can hold a mid-table place through regulated services and EU membership, not capability.

It ranks sixty-second. There is little domestic scale to build capability on.



Uruguay

Nascent tier

#63

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#63

RANK OF 93

10.6

COMPOSITE / 100

33rd

PERCENTILE

-84.1

POINTS VS #1

Small, but a digital-government model.

Uruguay has one of Latin America's best digital-government and education-technology records, notably its Ceibal programme, on a small population and research base.

It is the region's small-state model for digital public services and inclusion, well ahead of its size on governance.

It ranks sixty-third. The lever is scale, which its size caps.



Ukraine

Nascent tier

#64

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#64

RANK OF 93

10.5

COMPOSITE / 100

32nd

PERCENTILE

-84.2

POINTS VS #1

War-forged defence-tech talent.

Ukraine has become a live laboratory for battlefield AI — autonomous drones, targeting and defence software built under wartime pressure — on top of a long-standing pool of strong software engineers, even as invasion has damaged its wider economy.

It matters as the place AI-enabled warfare is being proven in real time, producing hard-won defence-tech capability and talent that far exceed its ranking on a civilian-weighted index.

It ranks sixty-fourth, its defence-AI and engineering strength invisible to a peacetime scoring. The lever, and the constraint, is the war itself and the reconstruction that will follow.



Ghana

Nascent tier

#65

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#65

RANK OF 93

10.4

COMPOSITE / 100

30th

PERCENTILE

-84.3

POINTS VS #1

West Africa's steady riser.

Ghana has a stable, growing tech scene, coder-training initiatives and improving connectivity, on a small compute and research base.

It is a steady West African riser, building digital skills and adoption ahead of frontier capability.

It ranks sixty-fifth. The lever is compute, capital and research on top of the skills base.



Costa Rica

Nascent tier

#66

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#66

RANK OF 93

10.3

COMPOSITE / 100

29th

PERCENTILE

-84.4

POINTS VS #1

Central America's services base.

Costa Rica has an educated workforce, a nearshore services and tech-manufacturing sector, and strong environmental and governance credentials, with a small research base.

It is Central America's quality-services hub, supplying skilled work to US firms rather than building AI itself.

It ranks sixty-sixth. The lever is moving up the value chain into research and products.



Algeria

Nascent tier

#67

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#67

RANK OF 93

10.2

COMPOSITE / 100

28th

PERCENTILE

-84.5

POINTS VS #1

Oil economy, early digitisation.

Algeria has a large young population and hydrocarbon wealth but has been slow to digitise, with a small AI research and compute base.

It is a North African economy where AI adoption trails its size and resources, held back by digitisation rather than talent.

It ranks sixty-seventh. The lever is the digital foundations that must come before capability.


Morocco

Nascent tier


#68

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93
COUNTRY

0-100



— COUNTRY — AVERAGE — LEADER — FIELD DENSITY



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#68

RANK OF 93

10.1

COMPOSITE / 100

27th

PERCENTILE

-84.6

POINTS VS #1

North Africa's connector.

Morocco pairs proximity and links to Europe, cheap-power potential and early Arabic and Darija model efforts such as AtlasIA with a small research and compute base.

It is positioning as a bridge between Europe and Africa for AI infrastructure and Arabic-language tools.

It ranks sixty-eighth. The lever is turning location and language work into domestic compute and research.



Armenia

Nascent tier

#69

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#69

RANK OF 93

10.0

COMPOSITE / 100

26th

PERCENTILE

-84.7

POINTS VS #1

A Caucasus IT niche.

Armenia has a strong IT and engineering culture, a global tech diaspora and the image-editing firm Picsart, on a small domestic market and compute base.

It shows a small Caucasus state can build a real software niche through talent and diaspora links.

It ranks sixty-ninth. The lever is capital and compute to scale beyond a niche.


Mauritius

Nascent tier


#70

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93
COUNTRY

0-100



— COUNTRY — AVERAGE — LEADER — FIELD DENSITY



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#70

RANK OF 93

9.7

COMPOSITE / 100

25th

PERCENTILE

-85

POINTS VS #1

An island services hub for Africa.

Mauritius is a financial and business-services hub for Africa with good connectivity, on a tiny domestic research and compute base.

It is a gateway-and-services economy, hosting activity for the continent rather than building AI itself.

It ranks seventieth. Its ceiling is size and a limited domestic base.



Mexico

Nascent tier

#71

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#71

RANK OF 93

9.7

COMPOSITE / 100

24th

PERCENTILE

-85

POINTS VS #1

Nearshoring's compute dividend.

Mexico is Latin America's second data-centre market, with the Queretaro cluster drawing multi-billion-dollar builds from AWS, CloudHQ and Microsoft, on the back of nearshoring, a 970,000-strong engineering workforce and proximity to the US market.

It matters as the compute and talent bridge to the United States — US firms relocating supply chains and data centres to a time-zone-aligned neighbour, turning nearshoring into an AI-infrastructure dividend.

It ranks seventy-first, its inbound infrastructure and talent ahead of domestic research and models. The lever is capturing more than the hosting role, building capability rather than just data centres on the demand next door.



Argentina

Nascent tier

#72

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#72

RANK OF 93

9.5

COMPOSITE / 100

23rd

PERCENTILE

-85.2

POINTS VS #1

Deep talent, and a \$25 billion compute bet.

Argentina has some of Latin America's strongest engineering and English-language talent, a national AI plan, and a landmark commitment in OpenAI's Stargate Argentina — a \$25 billion, 500-megawatt build in Patagonia under a new investment-incentive regime.

It is the clearest case of world-class talent and cheap Patagonian energy drawing frontier-scale compute to a country whose macro-economy has long deterred it — a potential step-change if the build lands.

It ranks seventy-second on current capability, but the Stargate commitment could move it sharply. The lever is execution, turning a signed intention and a talent pool into operating compute and companies.



Croatia

Nascent tier

#73

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93
COUNTRY

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#73

RANK OF 93

9.2

COMPOSITE / 100

22nd

PERCENTILE

-85.5

POINTS VS #1

A Balkan tech spark.

Croatia has a growing tech scene, the Rimac high-tech engineering success and a tourism-heavy economy, with a small research and compute base.

It shows a small Adriatic economy can produce world-class engineering in a niche, if not broad AI capability.

It ranks seventy-third. The lever is capital and research to broaden beyond a standout firm.



Nigeria

Nascent tier

#74

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#74

RANK OF 93

9.1

COMPOSITE / 100

21st

PERCENTILE

-85.6

POINTS VS #1

West Africa's gateway, fintech-first.

Nigeria pairs 220 million people and Africa's most active fintech ecosystem — more than 450 AI companies and over \$200 million in tech venture funding — with a 2024-28 national AI strategy and new data-centre build-outs, though much of its cloud still runs from South African regions.

It is West Africa's AI gateway, where the continent's largest population and a hungry fintech sector create demand that is starting to pull compute onshore rather than renting it abroad.

It ranks seventy-fourth, its scale and startup energy ahead of its infrastructure and research. The lever is local compute and power, converting demand into domestic capacity.



Tajikistan

Nascent tier

#75

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#75

RANK OF 93

9.1

COMPOSITE / 100

20th

PERCENTILE

-85.6

POINTS VS #1

Central Asia, from a low base.

Tajikistan is at an early stage of digitisation with limited connectivity, research and compute.

Its position is defined by the basic digital foundations it is still building, not by AI capability.

It ranks seventy-fifth. The lever is connectivity and skills before anything at the frontier.



Azerbaijan

Nascent tier

#76

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#76

RANK OF 93

9.1

COMPOSITE / 100

18th

PERCENTILE

-85.6

POINTS VS #1

Oil-funded digital ambition.

Azerbaijan is using energy revenue to fund digital-government and connectivity programmes, with a small research and compute base.

It is a Caucasus digitiser leaning on hydrocarbon capital rather than a domestic tech base.

It ranks seventy-sixth. The lever is turning capital into infrastructure and skills.



Pakistan

Nascent tier

#77

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#77

RANK OF 93

8.9

COMPOSITE / 100

17th

PERCENTILE

-85.8

POINTS VS #1

Scale of people, shortage of infrastructure.

Pakistan has a very large young population and a growing IT-services and freelancing sector, but limited compute, power and research infrastructure.

It is a huge potential talent pool constrained by the electricity, connectivity and capital that AI depends on.

It ranks seventy-seventh. The lever is infrastructure and power, without which the human scale cannot convert.



Iran

Nascent tier

#78

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#78

RANK OF 93

8.9

COMPOSITE / 100

16th

PERCENTILE

-85.8

POINTS VS #1

Capable, and cut off.

Iran retains a strong mathematics and STEM base and state AI ambitions, but sanctions, chip-access restrictions and isolation from the global cloud and research system severely constrain what it can build.

It matters as a sanctioned case — real domestic talent and intent operating almost entirely outside the compute, capital and collaboration networks the frontier runs on.

It ranks seventy-eighth, its human capital ahead of any access to the inputs that would let it compete. The gap is external, set by sanctions rather than aptitude, and it is not closing.



Senegal

Nascent tier

#79

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#79

RANK OF 93

8.6

COMPOSITE / 100

15th

PERCENTILE

-86.1

POINTS VS #1

Francophone Africa's tech bet.

Senegal is investing in a national technology programme and positioning as a Francophone West African digital hub, on a small research and compute base.

It is one of the more deliberate African digital bets, building rails and strategy ahead of capability.

It ranks seventy-ninth. The lever is compute, capital and research on top of the strategy.



Kenya

Nascent tier

#80

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#80

RANK OF 93

8.5

COMPOSITE / 100

14th

PERCENTILE

-86.2

POINTS VS #1

Silicon Savannah, built on mobile money.

Kenya's AI strength grows out of its mobile-money and digital-ID lead — M-Pesa, Konza Technology City, a national digital ID, and one of the continent's most detailed national AI strategies for 2025-30 — with a startup scene of around 200 AI companies.

It is East Africa's innovation hub, the clearest example of AI built on real, mass-adopted digital rails rather than on frontier compute. Adoption and inclusion, not scale, define its position.

It ranks eightieth, carried by adoption and strategy on a small capability base. The lever is compute and research investment to move from applying AI to building it.



Sri Lanka

Nascent tier

#81

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#81

RANK OF 93

8.5

COMPOSITE / 100

13th

PERCENTILE

-86.2

POINTS VS #1

IT services under strain.

Sri Lanka has an established IT-services and software-export sector and educated workforce, but recent economic crisis has constrained investment and infrastructure.

It is a services economy whose real engineering base is held back by macro-economic strain more than by talent.

It ranks eighty-first. The lever is stability and investment before capability.



Dominican Rep.

#82

Nascent tier

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#82

RANK OF 93

8.0

COMPOSITE / 100

12th

PERCENTILE

-86.7

POINTS VS #1

Caribbean services and nearshoring.

The Dominican Republic has a services and tourism economy and growing nearshore potential, with a small research and compute base.

It is a Caribbean nearshore candidate, positioned to supply services to the US rather than build AI.

It ranks eighty-second. The lever is skills and infrastructure to move up the chain.



Nepal

Nascent tier

#83

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#83

RANK OF 93

7.7

COMPOSITE / 100

11th

PERCENTILE

-87

POINTS VS #1

South Asia, an emerging IT thread.

Nepal has a growing IT-outsourcing thread and young workforce, on a very low compute, power and research base.

Its position is defined by early services growth against real infrastructure constraints.

It ranks eighty-third. The lever is connectivity, power and skills.



Cote d'Ivoire

Nascent tier

#84

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#84

RANK OF 93

7.5

COMPOSITE / 100

10th

PERCENTILE

-87.2

POINTS VS #1

Francophone West Africa, rising.

Cote d'Ivoire is a growing Francophone West African economy improving connectivity and digital services, on a small research and compute base.

It is a regional riser building digital adoption ahead of any frontier capability.

It ranks eighty-fourth. The lever is the full stack from connectivity upward.



Tunisia

Nascent tier

#85

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#85

RANK OF 93

7.3

COMPOSITE / 100

9th

PERCENTILE

-87.4

POINTS VS #1

Strong engineers, heavy emigration.

Tunisia has strong engineering and mathematics education but loses much of its talent to emigration, on a small domestic compute and capital base.

It is a talent producer more than a builder, supplying engineers to Europe rather than a home ecosystem.

It ranks eighty-fifth. The lever is retention and domestic investment.



Bangladesh

Nascent tier

#86

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#86

RANK OF 93

7.2

COMPOSITE / 100

8th

PERCENTILE

-87.5

POINTS VS #1

Vast population, thin infrastructure.

Bangladesh has a very large population, a garments-and-services economy and a growing IT sector, but limited compute, power and research infrastructure.

It is a demographic giant whose AI position is capped by the infrastructure and power its scale outstrips.

It ranks eighty-sixth. The lever is infrastructure and skills at population scale.


Rwanda

Nascent tier


#87

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93
COUNTRY

0-100



— COUNTRY — AVERAGE — LEADER — FIELD DENSITY



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#87

RANK OF 93

6.9

COMPOSITE / 100

7th

PERCENTILE

-87.8

POINTS VS #1

Small state, outsized ambition.

Rwanda has hosted the Global AI Summit in Kigali and pursues a deliberate digital-and-governance agenda, on a very small research and compute base.

It is Africa's clearest small-state ambition play, using convening power and strategy to punch above its size.

It ranks eighty-seventh. The lever is the capability base its strategy still needs beneath it.



Iraq

Nascent tier

#88

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#88

RANK OF 93

6.9

COMPOSITE / 100

5th

PERCENTILE

-87.8

POINTS VS #1

Oil, and a rebuild ahead.

Iraq has hydrocarbon wealth but limited digital infrastructure, research and capability after years of conflict and reconstruction.

Its position is defined by the basic rebuilding of digital foundations, not by AI.

It ranks eighty-eighth. The lever is infrastructure and stability first.



Zambia

Nascent tier

#89

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#89

RANK OF 93

6.7

COMPOSITE / 100

4th

PERCENTILE

-88

POINTS VS #1

Mining economy, early digital steps.

Zambia has a mining-led economy taking early digital and connectivity steps, on a very low compute and research base.

Its AI position is nascent, arriving through connectivity and enterprise rather than any domestic base.

It ranks eighty-ninth. The lever is connectivity, power and skills.



Benin

Nascent tier

#90

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#90

RANK OF 93

6.6

COMPOSITE / 100

3rd

PERCENTILE

-88.1

POINTS VS #1

Small, nascent, governance-led.

Benin has pursued some digital-government reform for its size but sits near the base of the table on every capability pillar.

Its modest placing rests on governance intent rather than any compute, research or capital base.

It ranks ninetieth. The lever is the entire capability stack, from the foundations up.



Cambodia

Nascent tier

#91

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#91

RANK OF 93

6.3

COMPOSITE / 100

2nd

PERCENTILE

-88.4

POINTS VS #1

Garments and tourism, low base.

Cambodia has a garments-and-tourism economy and early digital adoption, on a very low compute, research and power base.

Its AI position is early-stage, defined by the basic digital rails it is still laying.

It ranks ninety-first. The lever is connectivity, skills and power.



Ethiopia

Nascent tier

#92

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93

0-100



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#92

RANK OF 93

5.8

COMPOSITE / 100

1st

PERCENTILE

-88.9

POINTS VS #1

Huge population, a digital strategy, low base.

Ethiopia has published a digital and AI strategy and has a very large young population, but sits near the base on compute, power and research.

It is a demographic giant with intent but almost none of the infrastructure the frontier requires.

It ranks ninety-second. The lever is the foundations, power and connectivity above all.


Sierra Leone

Nascent tier


#93

LEAGUE POSITION • ALL 93
COUNTRY

0-100



— COUNTRY — AVERAGE — LEADER — FIELD DENSITY



WEDGE SHADING = FIELD DENSITY, PER PILLAR

#93

RANK OF 93

4.6

COMPOSITE / 100

0th

PERCENTILE

-90.1

POINTS VS #1

From the base of the table.

Sierra Leone sits at the bottom of the index, with minimal compute, connectivity, research and capital.

Its position reflects the earliest stage of digital development, where basic access precedes any AI capability.

It ranks ninety-third. The lever is the most basic digital foundations.

Each nation is a shape: where it spikes, and where it falls away.

The pack's gaps are exactly where strategy can move a rank.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

- 1 What is your country's pillar shape?
- 2 Which pillar is your gap?
- 3 Can a focused policy move your rank?

12

CHAPTER TWELVE

DISRUPTION WATCH

The moves that could redraw the board.

WHAT COULD RESET THE BOARD

Alongside the scored field, the index runs a parallel watch of moves that would not nudge a rank but redraw the board. Each is a falsifiable thesis with a tripwire and the pillar it would break.

China is standardising the AI token — 'ciyuan' — as a priceable, tradable settlement unit, building the rails of a state-governed token economy before the market matures.

WATCH · VERIFIED

In March 2026 the administrator of China's National Data Administration named the AI token 'ciyuan' and defined it as a settlement unit that is 'measurable, priceable and tradable'. By early 2026 China was processing 140 trillion tokens a day, up roughly 1,400-fold from the start of 2024. This is the most consequential move in the watch: it reframes AI output as a state-defined economic unit, and it lands on Capital, Governance and Trajectory at once. Tripwire: a formal ciyuan pricing or procurement standard published by the NDA.

A correction the index makes in the open: the widely-repeated claim that Singapore treats 'AI as a public utility' is not an official framing. Singapore's actual, sourced strategy is 'AI for the Public Good', refreshed in 2026 with national AI Missions in advanced manufacturing, financial services, connectivity and healthcare, a National AI Council chaired by the Prime Minister, and over a billion Singapore dollars of public AI R&D to 2030. The real story is stronger than the myth — and it is on the record.

Three further items sit on the watch, each with its tripwire: the single-foundry TSMC supply chain (a Taiwan shock removes almost all leading-edge fabrication overnight). The open-weight surge, in which Chinese models increasingly lead the open leaderboards and reset who sets the diffusion pace, and an energy discontinuity, in which the power constraint on Western compute is broken — or bites — first. Each would move a pillar, not a decimal.

The watch items are near-term shocks. Stand back to the end of the decade and the report's pillar-by-pillar forecasts resolve into four broad ways the board could look by 2030. Each is anchored to a specific tripwire already defined in the chapters above, so each is falsifiable rather than a mood — and the first, on current evidence, is the base case the rest are measured against.

FOUR WAYS THE BOARD BREAKS BY 2030

SCENARIO	BY 2030	THE TRIPWIRE TO WATCH	ODDS
Two poles hold	US leads on capital and compute. China near-parity.	No pillar tripwire breached (base case).	High
Capability commoditises	Open, cheap models erase the frontier premium.	A challenger tops capability and diffusion.	Medium
The capex reckoning	Capex-revenue gap forces the first big write-downs.	Lab revenue fails to pass ~\$300bn.	Medium
Agentic-cyber shock	Autonomous cyber shifts advantage to attackers.	A state ties an incident to an AI agent.	High

SCENARIOS SYNTHESISED FROM THE REPORT'S PILLAR FORECASTS. EACH MAPS TO A NAMED TRIPWIRE IN THE CHAPTER SHOWN. TRIPWIRES MAP TO THE DEPLOYMENT, CAPITAL AND SECURITY FORECASTS. ODDS ARE THE REPORT'S QUALITATIVE READ, NOT A MODEL OUTPUT.



The board is not static. Two moves could reset it inside a year.

Each watch item is a thesis with a tripwire, not a prediction.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

- 1 Which disruption would break your pillar?
- 2 Is your strategy resilient to a supply shock?
- 3 Are you watching the right tripwire?

13

CHAPTER 13

METHOD & THE FIELD

How the index is built — and why you can trust it.

SHOW THE WORKING

The incumbent indices hand you a number from data you cannot check. This one is built to be reproduced — every load-bearing figure is current and cited, a labelled 311 construction with its method, or a declared void.

Two honesty notes close the method. The composite currently rests on a transcription of a licensed third-party index whose leaders are independently validated but whose gated mid-table cell values are trust, not re-verification — so it ships as a labelled 311 construct pending open-primary cross-validation. The ranking covers the 93 sovereign economies in the licensed source set. Its remaining entry, the EU bloc, is held out so the comparison stays strictly national. And the Security pillar is a construct on dated capability baselines, not a live cyber-power score. Both are stated on the page rather than hidden, because a benchmark that hides its weaknesses is not a benchmark.

The weights are declared, not hidden: Compute 16, Research 15, Talent 14, Capital 14 and Governance 13 on the five live pillars, with Security, Deployment and Trajectory layered on as their data matured. No part of it is tuned to a preferred result — and the two checks that follow, one against a rival dataset and one against the weights themselves, are there to prove that rather than assert it.

To prove the ranking is not an artefact of one gated source, the composite is cross-validated against Stanford's open Global AI Vibrancy index — a different dataset, different indicators, different weights.









Cross-validated against Stanford's open Global AI Vibrancy index — a different dataset, different indicators, different weights — the two composites agree strongly, a rank correlation of about 0.72 across the shared top set. The United States and China lock at first and second on both, with the same large gap to third. That agreement is the point: the index's hardest finding does not depend on any one source.

The disagreement is just as informative, and it concentrates in two places. India rises to third on Vibrancy because that index weights research, talent and publications, where India's pipeline is world-class. Singapore is third on 311 because 311 weights compute, capital and governance, where a small, well-run state spikes. The rest of the field reshuffles inside a narrow band. The honest

reading is that the two-power top is settled and the rest is a tight field, which is why the index publishes it as one, with the open Vibrancy composite shown alongside the licensed-source composite so any reader can reproduce the result.

A ranking should say how much to trust each position. Every pillar weight was perturbed 4,000 times and the field re-ranked, plus an equal-weight and a leave-one-pillar-out run.

RANK STABILITY UNDER 4,000 WEIGHT PERTURBATIONS

COUNTRY	RANK	RANK RANGE (1–12)	STABILITY
United States	1		LOCKED
China	2		LOCKED
Singapore	3		LOCKED
South Korea	4		FIRM
UK	5		FIRM
France	6		FIRM
Israel	7		FIRM
Canada	8		FIRM
UAE	9		VOLATILE
Germany	10		SOFT
Japan	11		SOFT

MONTE-CARLO RANK STABILITY (WEIGHTS PERTURBED +/-3, RENORMALISED) + EQUAL-WEIGHT CHECK. REPRODUCIBLE: SENSITIVITY.PY.

The result disciplines every claim in the report. The United States, China and Singapore are LOCKED — their ranks never move, under any weighting or the equal-weight run. The pack behind them is firm to soft: the UK, South Korea, France, Israel and Canada shift by at most one place. Germany, Japan and Switzerland by two or three. Only the UAE is volatile, swinging from 8th to 12th because its score leans on governance, which the perturbation stresses hardest.

This also settles the Singapore-versus-India question from the cross-validation. Singapore's #3 is not fragile — it is locked inside 311's weighting. India's #3 on Vibrancy comes from a different pillar set (research and talent), not from a weighting that 311 could tune away. The honest one-line reading: within this index the top three are fixed points, the pack is a band, and where a rival index disagrees it is measuring something different — which is exactly what a benchmark should be able to say about itself.

The method sits on the page, in full.

Every cell carries a source, or it is marked void.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

1 Can you reproduce this ranking from the sources?

2 Where are the single-source flags?

3 What would change the weights?

14

CHAPTER 14

ANNEX — THE FULL DATA

Every ranked economy, every pillar score.

EVERY SCORE, ALL 93

Every ranked economy and every live pillar score in one place, so any position in the report can be checked against the numbers beneath it. Scores are 0-100 (100 = the frontier leader). The composite is the number the league ranks on. Source: 311 composite — licensed third-party pillars re-weighted, cross-validated on Stanford HAI. Security, Deployment and Trajectory are scored as separate layers in their own chapters.

Read the appendix against Part One. The 311 column is the composite the league ranks on. The five columns beside it are the live pillars that build it, each normalised so the frontier leader scores 100. The shape of a row is the shape of the nation: a flat, high row is a full-stack power, a single tall column is a specialist, and a low row with one spike is a nation with one lever to pull. Every ranked economy carries a score on all five live pillars — there are no voids in this table, because these are the pillars for which a current source exists for all 93.

311 DATA APPENDIX — RANKS 1-31

#	COUNTRY	311	COMP	RES	TAL	CAP	GOV
1	United States	94.7	100	100	100	100	70
2	China	69.4	91	80	54	45	74
3	Singapore	40.2	37	24	39	22	84
4	UK	33.0	19	28	26	26	72
5	South Korea	33.0	35	27	12	14	80
6	France	31.1	24	24	18	17	76
7	Israel	30.5	19	24	21	31	62
8	Canada	28.7	23	19	21	23	62
9	UAE	26.8	24	7	7	17	85
10	Germany	26.4	21	22	23	15	54
11	Japan	25.9	34	10	12	16	60
12	Switzerland	25.4	23	14	24	14	54
13	Netherlands	24.6	26	8	14	19	60
14	Saudi Arabia	23.0	18	4	4	24	71
15	Taiwan	23.0	33	6	6	9	64
16	India	22.5	14	6	32	16	48
17	Finland	21.8	21	11	10	13	58
18	Norway	20.8	29	5	6	10	56
19	Sweden	20.1	21	7	9	21	45
20	Denmark	19.9	19	6	8	9	61
21	Australia	19.1	18	8	10	11	52
22	Spain	19.0	19	5	10	10	54
23	Ireland	18.9	18	5	10	14	51
24	Malaysia	18.3	21	2	3	7	62
25	Brazil	17.8	18	2	8	11	53
26	Iceland	17.6	34	6	3	11	33
27	Luxembourg	17.4	18	6	11	9	46
28	Estonia	17.1	13	2	9	17	48
29	Russia	16.6	17	2	7	11	50
30	Italy	16.5	15	4	7	6	54
31	Austria	16.4	16	6	8	8	48

311 DATA APPENDIX — RANKS 32-62

#	COUNTRY	311	COMP	RES	TAL	CAP	GOV
32	Greece	16.1	11	4	7	12	50
33	Qatar	16.0	20	2	8	1	52
34	Belgium	15.9	14	5	6	10	48
35	New Zealand	15.6	17	4	5	7	48
36	Hungary	15.5	15	2	7	4	54
37	Poland	15.4	16	2	10	5	46
38	Vietnam	15.2	17	0	7	4	51
39	Lithuania	14.9	13	2	7	5	52
40	Slovenia	14.8	15	2	5	6	49
41	Thailand	14.6	18	1	4	5	48
42	Portugal	14.5	15	4	5	6	46
43	Bahrain	14.4	19	2	5	8	40
44	Czech Rep.	14.0	12	2	6	6	48
45	Chile	13.9	19	1	3	3	46
46	Indonesia	13.2	8	0	6	7	48
47	Romania	12.8	16	1	5	0	44
48	Philippines	12.7	12	0	5	4	46
49	Egypt	12.5	10	1	5	3	47
50	Turkey	12.3	11	2	5	4	42
51	Jordan	12.0	14	2	2	2	43
52	Colombia	11.9	12	0	3	4	43
53	Oman	11.8	13	0	5	0	44
54	Kuwait	11.8	20	0	4	0	36
55	South Africa	11.7	10	1	3	7	40
56	Uzbekistan	11.7	11	0	4	1	46
57	Serbia	11.6	11	1	3	1	46
58	Bulgaria	11.6	11	0	3	2	44
59	Peru	11.2	13	0	3	2	40
60	Latvia	11.0	12	2	5	3	36
61	Slovakia	10.9	12	2	5	3	36
62	Malta	10.8	14	5	4	4	28

311 DATA APPENDIX — RANKS 63-93

#	COUNTRY	311	COMP	RES	TAL	CAP	GOV
63	Uruguay	10.6	14	0	2	1	38
64	Ukraine	10.5	11	0	4	2	38
65	Ghana	10.4	7	0	3	7	38
66	Costa Rica	10.3	12	0	4	2	36
67	Algeria	10.2	8	0	4	0	42
68	Morocco	10.1	10	1	4	1	37
69	Armenia	10.0	10	2	2	6	32
70	Mauritius	9.7	9	0	2	8	32
71	Mexico	9.7	12	0	4	5	28
72	Argentina	9.5	12	0	4	3	30
73	Croatia	9.2	11	2	4	5	26
74	Nigeria	9.1	3	0	4	2	40
75	Tajikistan	9.1	6	0	2	3	38
76	Azerbaijan	9.1	11	0	2	0	34
77	Pakistan	8.9	2	1	5	1	39
78	Iran	8.9	9	2	5	1	30
79	Senegal	8.6	5	0	2	0	40
80	Kenya	8.5	2	0	3	6	34
81	Sri Lanka	8.5	5	0	3	4	33
82	Dominican Rep.	8.0	9	0	1	2	30
83	Nepal	7.7	6	0	3	0	32
84	Cote d'Ivoire	7.5	4	0	3	2	31
85	Tunisia	7.3	7	2	3	1	26
86	Bangladesh	7.2	5	0	6	1	26
87	Rwanda	6.9	3	0	2	0	32
88	Iraq	6.9	9	0	4	0	22
89	Zambia	6.7	3	0	2	0	31
90	Benin	6.6	2	0	2	0	32
91	Cambodia	6.3	6	0	2	2	23
92	Ethiopia	5.8	0	0	3	0	29
93	Sierra Leone	4.6	1	0	2	0	22

Nothing withheld: every score, every pillar, all 93.

The whole index in one table, for you to check.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

1 Can you find your nation and its five pillar scores?

2 Does the composite match the league in Part One?

3 Which sub-pillar is your gap?

I STRATEGIC SUMMARY

The 2026 picture is a paradox the whole report turns on: the United States has never led by more on capital and compute, and never led by less on the capability that capital is supposed to buy. China has closed the frontier to under three percent while spending twenty-three times less, and is now standardising the unit of the AI economy itself.

So the decisive contest has moved. A near-parity model can now be reached at a fraction of the leader's spend, so the edges that will decide the next decade are defence, deployment and direction — who can protect the stack, who can diffuse it, and whose money converts fastest into capability. This index scores all three, shows its working, and names its voids. The countries to watch are the ones already turning models they own into capability they use.

311

SECTION

ANNEX

NOTES AND METHOD

How this was done. Eight pillars built on a handful of hard facts. Five (Compute, Research, Talent, Capital, Governance) are scored from a licensed third-party index, re-weighted to 311 pillars. Security is constructed, Deployment is a twelve-vertical matrix, and Trajectory is built on open velocities. Current-or-construct. Every figure is current and cited, or a labelled 311 construction with method shown, or deliberately dated with an on-page reason. No naked stale data. Triangulate or flag. Load-bearing figures are confirmed by two or more independent sources. Single-source figures are flagged on the page. Void, never invent. Where no source exists — nine of twelve deployment verticals, several tail cells — the cell is void, not zero. Reproducible by design. The macro spine and Trajectory sit on open datasets (Stanford HAI, Epoch AI). The composite is being cross-validated on open primaries, so it leans on no gated source. This is analysis for decision-makers, not investment or legal advice.

TRUST BANDS

PRIMARY

Original / authoritative source.

CORROBORATED

Confirmed from 2+ independent sources.

SINGLE-SOURCE

One source, uncorroborated — hold lightly.

UNVERIFIED

Authenticity or accuracy in question — treat with caution.

FORESIGHT

311 projection / inference — labelled, not fact.

SOURCE LEDGER

The report's figures, each traced to its origin, dated, and tiered. Every entry below is cited on the page it supports; the full per-claim ledger ships in the companion data.

#	CLAIM & SOURCE	DATE	TIER
01	Overall composite — the five live pillars, re-weighted to 311's pillars. THE OBSERVER'S GLOBAL AI INDEX 2025 (6TH ED.)	2025	SINGLE-SOURCE
02	Cross-validation of the composite (rank correlation of about 0.72). STANFORD HAI — GLOBAL AI VIBRANCY INDEX (2026 AI INDEX)	2026	PRIMARY
03	Notable AI models produced, 2025. STANFORD HAI, 2026 AI INDEX	2026	PRIMARY
04	AI data-centre count (US hosts >10× any other nation). STANFORD HAI, 2026 AI INDEX	2026	PRIMARY
05	Frontier model rankings and lead swaps since DeepSeek-R1. STANFORD HAI, 2026 AI INDEX (LMARENA)	2026	PRIMARY
06	Generative-AI patent families by inventor country. WIPO PATENT LANDSCAPE REPORT ON GENAI (2024) + 2026 SPARK UPDATE	2024–26	PRIMARY
07	Where elite AI researchers are trained vs where they work. MACROPOLO — GLOBAL AI TALENT TRACKER 3.0	2025	PRIMARY
08	Private AI investment, 2025 (US:China ratio 23.1×). STANFORD HAI, 2026 AI INDEX (QUID)	2026	PRIMARY
09	AI startup VC by country, 2025 (US share about 79%). CRUNCHBASE, CORROBORATED BY OECD.AI (PREQIN) AND CB INSIGHTS	2025	CORROBORATED

SOURCE LEDGER (CONT.)

#	CLAIM & SOURCE	DATE	TIER
10	Foundation-model labs and 2025 AI venture funding. CRUNCHBASE, CB INSIGHTS, OECD.AI	2025	CORROBORATED
11	Robot density and manufacturing installs. IFR WORLD ROBOTICS 2025	2025	PRIMARY
12	Cyber commitment and security readiness. ITU GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY INDEX (GCI) 2024	2024	PRIMARY
13	Security and deployment matrix cells. OECD 2026, SIPRI 2026, IEA 2025–26, OXFORD INSIGHTS 2025, HAI 2026	2025–26	CORROBORATED
14	Trajectory velocities — compute, capital and capability growth. EPOCH AI — TRENDS IN AI 2026 (OPEN DATA)	2026	PRIMARY
15	China standardises the AI token as ‘ciyuan’, a tradable settlement unit. 140 trillion tokens/day. NDA (VIA SCMP, SEMAFOR, FORTUNE, JAMESTOWN)	Mar 2026	PRIMARY
16	Singapore’s framing is ‘AI for the Public Good’ + national AI Missions. SINGAPORE MDDI / SMART NATION	2026	PRIMARY
17	League choropleth — country boundaries and geometry. NATURAL EARTH (BASE MAP); 311 COMPOSITE (VALUES)	2026	PRIMARY
18	Sub-pillar scores and declared weights across the five live pillars. 311 COMPOSITE — DECLARED INPUTS, WEIGHTS AND SENSITIVITY RUNS	2026	SINGLE-SOURCE

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